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MOVING TOWARDS A NOMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
COURT? CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE SHIFT 
FROM JUDICIAL ACTIVISM TO CONSTITUTIONAL
IRRELEVANCE IN TAIWAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS
Ming-Sung Kuo†
Abstract: The Taiwan Constitutional Court (TCC, also known as the 
Council of Grand Justices) has been regarded as a central player in Taiwan’s transition to 
democracy in the late twentieth century.  Transforming from a rubberstamp under the 
authoritarian regime into a facilitator of political dispute settlement, the TCC channelled 
volatile political forces into its jurisdiction.  Thanks to the TCC’s judicial activism, the 
judicialization of constitutional politics was characteristic of Taiwan’s democratization in 
the last two decades of the twentieth century.  The TCC scholarship asserts that the TCC 
has continued to play a pivotal role in Taiwan’s constitutional politics in the twenty-first 
century.  Taking issue with this popular view, this article focuses on twenty-first century 
TCC case law to argue that Taiwan’s constitutional politics has moved towards 
de-judicialization as the TCC has gradually turned away from judicial activism in the 
face of escalating constitutional conflicts.  With the TCC retreating from constitutional 
politics, this article argues that its constitutional jurisdiction is becoming nominal with 
the Constitution losing its grip on politics again.
I. INTRODUCTION: JUDICIALIZATION OF TAIWAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL 
POLITICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
The role of courts of law in new democracies is one of the most 
discussed subjects in scholarship on democratic transition and comparative 
judicial politics. There is disagreement, however, on what that role is and 
how much power courts in new democracies actually wield.  Some scholars 
point to the fact that dormant, subservient courts awakened to calls for the 
rule of law and helped democratic movements by reining in state power of 
authoritarian regimes through judicial rulings;1 others note the installation 
† Associate Professor of Law, University of Warwick, United Kingdom; J.S.D, LL.M., Yale Law 
School; LL.M., LL.B., National Taiwan University. This article is based on some of the results of my 
research project titled “The Rise and Fall of Juristocracy in Taiwan: Lessons from the Role of the Taiwan 
Constitutional Court in Managing the Jurisdictional Conflict between the Political Departments, 
1948–2012,” funded by the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange (Project 
Number: RG001-U-12). I also benefited from discussions with Ms. Hui-Wen Chen and her suggestions. I
heartily acknowledge the excellent editing work of The Washington International Law Journal. Any errors 
are mine. M-S.Kuo@warwick.ac.uk.
1 See, e.g., JENS MEIERHENRICH, THE LEGACIES OF LAW: LONG-RUN CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1652–2000 219–39, 315–19 (2008); Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional 
Courts in East Asia: Understanding Variation, 3 J. COMP. L. 80, 82–83 (2008). 
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of nascent courts in post-authoritarian politics as a means of consolidating 
constitutional democracy.2 In terms of this juxtaposition, the story of the 
TCC3 straddles the line between resurgence and nascence in the study of the 
judicial role in democratic transition.4 On one hand, the resurgent TCC 
noticeably morphed into the facilitator of democratic transition in the early 
1990s, even though it had previously rubberstamped the policies of the 
Kuomintang (KMT, also known as the Chinese Nationalist Party) party-state 
regime before.5 On the other hand, like nascent courts installed during 
democratic transitions in other countries, the TCC has been praised as a 
guardian of Taiwan’s new democracy since the 1996 popular presidential 
election,6 which paved the way for the country’s first majority ruling party 
change when Mr. Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the 
independence-inclined Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was elected 
President.7
It should be noted that the TCC did not play its facilitator-guardian 
role in its own right at the height of Taiwan’s transition to democracy during 
the last two decades of the twentieth century. The TCC’s transformation 
into a facilitator and guardian of democracy began during a period of 
fundamental constitutional revision in Taiwan.8 From 1991 to 2000, there 
2 See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 85–91. See generally MATTHEW C. INGRAM, CRAFTING 
COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: THE POLITICS OF SUBNATIONAL JUDICIAL REFORM IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO
(2015); WOJCIEC SADURSKI, RIGHTS BEFORE COURTS: A STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
POSTCOMMUNIST STATES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE (2d ed. 2014); Theunis Roux, Constitutional 
Courts as Democratic Consolidators: Insights from South Africa After 20 Years, 42 J. S. AFR. STUD. 5 
(2016). 
3 For the jurisdiction, organization, and procedures of the TCC, see Wen-Chen Chang, The Role of 
Judicial Review in Consolidating Democracy: The Case of Taiwan, 2 ASIA L. REV. 73 (2005) [hereinafter 
Wen-Chen Chang, The Case of Taiwan]; Wen-Chen Chang, Courts and Judicial Reform in Taiwan: 
Gradual Transformations towards the Guardian of Constitutionalism and Rule of Law, in ASIAN COURTS 
IN CONTEXT 143, 148–49, 155–56 (Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang eds., 2015) [hereinafter Wen-Chen 
Chang, Gradual Transformations]. 
4 For an examination of a constitutional court transitioning from a democratic to an authoritarian 
system, see Eric C. Ip, The Politics of Constitutional Common Law in Hong Kong Under Chinese 
Sovereignty, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 565 (2016).
5 See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 82–84.
6 See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 169–72.
7 This article follows the convention in the press that places the Chinese surname before the first 
name when referring to Taiwanese politicians. 
8 See generally Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of Fatung: Representational Manipulation and 
Reconstruction in Taiwan, in THE PEOPLE’S REPRESENTATIVES: ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 
REGION 23 (Graham Hassall & Cheryl Saunders eds., 1997) [hereinafter Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of 
Fatung].
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were six rounds of constitutional revision9 aimed at reforming the externally 
imposed Chinese Constitution of 1947 (the Constitution) to fit the emerging 
island-nation of Taiwan.10 Moreover, the TCC’s transformation was not 
only synchronized with the democratic driving forces of constitutional 
reform, but was also an activist institutional player in the theatre of 
constitutional politics.11 Continuously steering the interrelationship among 
other constitutional powers within the political branch via a series of 
constitutional interpretations,12 the TCC defied the conventional wisdom 
that courts should avoid such high politics.13 Instead of involving itself in 
the political vortex to the detriment of its independence and institutional 
integrity, the TCC emerged as the principal arbitrator of disputes between 
other constitutional powers.14 For example, in December 1996, the TCC 
thwarted the political will of President Lee Teng-hui, who had just won a 
landslide victory in the first presidential election by popular vote early that 
year, by essentially declaring unconstitutional the retention of his then-heir 
apparent Vice President Lien Chan for the Premiership of the Administration 
(Executive Yuan) in Interpretation No. 419.15
9 The Constitution was revised again in 2005, which was the last time it has been amended. 
10 See Ming-Sung Kuo, W(h)ither the Idea of Publicness? Besieged Democratic Legitimacy Under 
the Extraconstitutional Hybrid Regulation across the Taiwan Strait, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 221, 227–30
(2011) (referring to the changed constitutional provision, this article adopts the more popular term 
“amendment” in place of the official designation “additional article”) [hereinafter Ming-Sung Kuo, 
W(h)ither the Idea of Publicness?].
11 See Albert H.Y. Chen, Constitutions and Values in Three Chinese Societies, in AN INQUIRY INTO
THE EXISTENCE OF GLOBAL VALUES: THROUGH THE LENS OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 119, 
126–27 (Dennis Davis et al. eds., 2015).
12 See Ming-Sung Kuo (悕所㜦), Wei Xian Shen Cha Ji Zhi Jie Jue Zheng Zhi Jiang Ju Ke Neng 
Xing zhi Ping Gu: Yi Si Fa Yuan Da Fa Guan Zhen Dui Zheng Zhi Bu Men Quan Xian Zheng Yi zhi Jie Shi 
Wei Zhong Xin (忽ㅚ⮑㞍㨇⇞妋㰢㓧㱣₝⯨⎗傥⿏ᷳ姽Ộ烉ẍ⎠㱽昊⣏㱽⭀憅⮵㓧㱣悐攨㪲旸䇕嬘ᷳ
妋慳䁢ᷕ⽫) [Judicial Review as a Solution to Political Gridlocks? A Study of Taiwan’s Grand Justices 
Council Interpretations Regarding the Jurisdictional Disputes within the Political Branch], 30 TAI DA FA
XUE LUN CONG (⎘⣏㱽⬠婾⎊) [NAT’L. TAIWAN U.L.J.] 251, 251–89 (2001) [hereinafter Ming-Sung 
Kuo, Judicial Review].
13 See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 60–170 (1980).  Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–243 (1986).
14 See Kuo, Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 281–35.
15 J.Y. Interpretation No. 419 (Const. Ct. Dec. 31, 1996); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=419 (I use “Interpretation” rather than “J.Y. Interpretation” to refer to a TCC 
official ruling. It is true that the TCC stopped short of invalidating Mr. Lien’s Premiership. Yet, it is not 
out of the question that this proved what Jiunn-rong Yeh calls the TCC’s deference to President 
Lee.). Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics and the Judicial Facilitation of Dialogue between Political 
Actors in New Asian Democracies: Comparing the South Korean and Taiwanese Experiences, 8 INT’L J.
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Yet the foremost example of the TCC’s activist approach to 
constitutional politics was its handling of the so-called unconstitutional 
constitutional amendments.16 In March 2000, just days after Mr. Chen was 
elected President, the TCC declared the fifth round of constitutional 
revisions unconstitutional and thus null and void, despite the absence of a 
so-called eternity clause in the Constitution.17 What made Interpretation No. 
499 intriguing was that the all-powerful National Assembly, which had final 
say on constitutional revision until then and had passed the impugned 
constitutional amendments, inflicted no severe vengeance on the TCC in the 
CONST. L. 911, 933 (2010) [hereinafter Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics]. See also WEN-CHEN 
CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA: CASES AND MATERIALS 218 (2014) (discussing the obscurity 
of Interpretation No. 419 but without noting the TCC’s “non-conformity” statement) [hereinafter 
WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA]. Specifically, expecting the TCC’s ruling, Lee 
convened a round table talk from December 23 to 28, 1996, which was aimed at giving the president the 
unilateral appointment power over the Premiership, among other things, in the next round of constitutional 
revision. Instead of defying the TCC’s “non-conformity” declaration to the effect that his retention of Mr. 
Lien for the Premiership was “not . . . completely in conformity with the Constitution,” Lee simply carried 
out the conclusion of the foregoing bipartisan meeting in the fourth round of constitutional revision in 
1997. Notably, equipped with the new unilateral appointment power, Lee appointed a new Premier instead 
of retaining Lien, a clear concession to the TCC’s entreaty that the dispute be dealt with “in accordance 
with the ruling” that the retention “will not be completely in conformity with the Constitution.” A note on 
my English rendering of the TCC case law is due. Unless directly quoted, all English renderings in this 
article are mine to make them more readable.  
16 The question of unconstitutional constitutional amendments has recently resurfaced in
constitutional scholarship, especially in English-language works. See, e.g., Richard Albert, 
Nonconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 22 CAN. J. L & JURIS. 1 (2009); Aharon Barak, 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments, 44 ISRAEL L. REV. 321 (2011); Yaniv Roznai, The Theory 
and Practice of ‘Supra-Constitutional’ Limits on Constitutional Amendments, 62 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 557
(2013); Rosalind Dixon & David Landau, Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of 
Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606 (2015). Yet it has long been 
theoretically contemplated among constitutional lawyers in civil law jurisdictions as well as in Common 
law countries. See, e.g., CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 150–53 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 
2008); WILLIAM F. HARRIS II, THE INTERPRETABLE CONSTITUTION 169–72 (1993). Under the influence of 
German constitutional theories, Taiwanese constitutional scholars had already written prolifically on the 
various issues surrounding unconstitutional constitutional amendments even when Taiwan was still under 
the martial-law rule. See, e.g., Ming-Sung Kuo (悕所㜦), Cong Xian Fa Xiu Zheng Tiao Wen zhi Ke Si Fa 
Xing Lun Zheng Zhi Wen Ti Bu Shen Cha Yuan Ze: Yi Mei Guo Lian Bang Xian Fa Di Er Shi Qi Zeng Bu 
Tiao Kuan Wei Li (⽆ㅚ㱽ᾖ㬋㡅㔯ᷳ⎗⎠㱽⿏婾㓧㱣⓷柴ᶵ⮑㞍⍇⇯--ẍ伶⚳倗恎ㅚ㱽䫔Ḵ⋩ᶫ⡆
墄㡅㫦䁢ἳ) [On the Constitutionality of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: An 
Analysis of the Political Question Doctrine and the Justiciability of Constitutional Amendments], 23 XIAN 
ZHENG SHI DAI (ㅚ㓧㗪ẋ) [CONST. REV.] 1, 1 (1998).
17 Unlike some countries whose constitutions include the clause that contains explicit restrictions on 
the substance of constitutional amendment, namely the eternity clause, the Constitution of 1947 provides 
for no such explicit restriction. See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 170. For 
a discussion on the eternity clause, see Ulrich K. Preuss, The Implications of “Eternity Clauses:” The 
German Experience, 44 ISR. L. REV. 429 (2011). 
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wake of this constitutional blow. 18 Instead, the National Assembly 
responded with a sixth round of constitutional revisions that virtually 
rendered itself defunct, a long-pursued goal of constitutional reform 
considered unachievable due to its exclusive power to approve bills of 
constitutional amendment. 19 In a word, Taiwan’s experience with 
democratic transition in the late twentieth century both reflected a broad 
trend towards the judicialization of politics in new democracies and 
indicated judicial activism in constitutional politics.20
In this light, the TCC has been seen not only as an activist court, but 
also as a normative one in two respects: first, as a court, its rulings have 
been faithfully observed by other constitutional powers and political parties 
and it has effectively settled politically charged disputes;21 and second, as 
the ordained interpreter of the Constitution, it has helped change Taiwan’s 
“semantic” constitution into a “normative” order with its interpretations.22
18 But see Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 171–72. Notably, the TCC 
was not affected as an institution even though the sequel constitutional revision of April 2000 provided that 
justices be treated differentially: those coming from the judicial corps of career judges and prosecutors 
would receive a better pension plan under Amendment 5, Section 1. See also Po Jen Yap, Constitutional 
Fig Leaves in Asia, 25 WASH. INT’L L.J. 421, 441 (2016).
19 The defunct National Assembly was not completely abolished until the seventh and last round of 
constitutional revision in 2005, when the power to approve bills of constitutional amendment was placed in 
the hands of the electorate through referendum. See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ASIA, supra note 15, at 297.
20 See Wen-Chen Chang, The Case of Taiwan, supra note 3. For a discussion on the role of strong 
judicial review in post-communist central and eastern Europe, see generally RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW 
AFTER COMMUNISM (Adam Czarnota et al. eds., 2005).
21 See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 177. A terminological 
clarification is due. Formally speaking, the TCC’s decision takes the form of interpretation. As its 
interpretations result from referrals or petitions prompted by constitutional disputes, the TCC effectively 
rules on disputes through interpretations. For purposes of elegance and simplicity, this article uses
“interpretation,” “ruling,” “judgment,” and “decision” interchangeably when referring to TCC case law.
22 Karl Loewenstein, a German émigré and Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Science at 
Amherst, classified constitutions into three ideal types: normative, nominal, and semantic. A constitution is 
“normative” not only for its reflection of the values of constitutional democracy in content but also for the 
implementation of its content in practice. In contrast, if a constitution reflects the values of constitutional 
democracy in content only but is unenforced, Loewenstein called it “nominal.” “Semantic” constitutions 
are the most intriguing in Loewenstein’s tripartite classification. Unlike nominal constitutions, there is no 
discrepancy between content and practice in semantic constitutions. Yet the content of semantic 
constitutions simply reflects the political will of dictators, making mockery of constitutionalism. The 
“constitutional” documents of the Fascist/Nazi regimes in the interwar period are Loewenstein’s examples 
of semantic constitutions. See KARL LOEWENSTEIN, POLITICAL POWER AND THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS
147–53 (1957). Notably, prior to the first round of constitutional revision in 1991, Taiwan was governed 
by the so-called Temporary Provisions, which were enacted in accordance with the Constitution’s 
amendment clause, alongside part of the Constitution that was not suspended (or rather replaced) by the 
former. Also noteworthy is that Temporary Provisions were not formally incorporated into the 
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Judicial activism and the making of a normative constitutional order seem to 
have developed simultaneously, which has been the focus of scholarship on 
the TCC. 23 Simply put, the constitutional order in post-authoritarian 
Taiwan has taken on the character of “judicial constitutionalism.” 24
Focusing either on the unchanged institutional features of the TCC or on the 
number of statutes and regulations it has struck down, the popular view held
by TCC scholars maintains that the TCC has carried over its glorious record 
of the twentieth century into its operation in the twenty-first century.25
This article takes issue with the assumed continuation of the TCC’s activist 
and normative role in Taiwan’s constitutional politics at the core of this 
upbeat view.
Against this optimistic image of judicial politics portrayed in much of 
the TCC scholarship, this article argues that the TCC’s role in Taiwan’s 
constitutional politics has been substantially curtailed since 
2000. Analyzing TCC case law from 2000 to 2016,26 this article will 
demonstrate that the TCC’s importance and influence has continuously 
shrunk during this period. This trend began with the intensified partisan 
rivalry between the KMT-dominated Pan Blue group and the DPP-led Pan 
Green camp during President Chen’s tenure, followed by the KMT’s 
Constitution. See TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN 
ASIAN CASES 113–15 (2003); John Garver, Introduction: Taiwan’s Democratic Consolidation, in
TAIWAN’S DEMOCRACY: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES 1, 19 (Robert Ash et al. eds., 2011). As 
Temporary Provisions embodied the will of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the expense of the values of 
constitutional democracy embraced by the Constitution, Taiwan’s pre-1991 constitutional order evokes 
what Loewenstein called a semantic constitution.  See, e.g., Chang Chia-Yin (⻝▱⯡), Taiwan Xian Fa 
Bian Qian de Xian Fa Xue Kao Cha (冢䀋ㅚ㱽嬲怟䘬ㅚ㱽⬠侫⮇) [Constitutional Change in Taiwan: A 
Constitutional Theoretical Perspective], 3 TAIWAN MIN ZHU JI KAN (冢䀋㮹ᷣ⬋↲ ) [TAIWAN 
DEMOCRACY Q.] 129, 129–64 (2006).
23 See, e.g., Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformations, supra note 3, at 169–72; Jou-Jou Chu, 
Global Constitutionalism and Judicial Activism in Taiwan, 38 J. CONTEMP. ASIA 515 (2008); Tom 
Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 763, 771–73 (2008).  
24 See Mark Tushnet, The Relationship Between Political Constitutionalism and Weak-Form Judicial 
Review, 14 GER. L.J. 2249, 2250, 2250 n.1 (2013).
25 See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 944; Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen 
Chang, A Decade of Changing Constitutionalism in Taiwan: Transitional and Transnational Perspectives,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA IN THE EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 141, 167–68 (Albert H.Y. Chen 
ed., 2014). Cf. Jau-Yuan Hwang, Taiwan’s Constitutional Court from 2003 to 2011: New Appointments 
and Different Performance, 53 SEOUL L.J. 41, 51–62 (2013).
26 So far only two interpretations (Interpretations No. 735 and 736) have been promulgated in 2016.  
Interpretation No. 736 concerned the right of school teachers and university lecturers to judicial remedy 
while the parliamentary motion of no confidence was at the core of Interpretation No. 735. This article will 
further discuss Interpretation No. 735 in infra Part II.B.
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triumphant return to power in 2008.27 Although both the legally defined 
jurisdiction of the TCC and the institutional guarantee of its independence 
remained unchanged,28 its rulings failed to settle crucial political disputes 
when the Pan Blue and the Pan Green were engaged in a political zero-sum 
game during the DPP’s eight-year reign. Later on, the reconstituted TCC 
retreated from the activist role of its predecessor and became its recent 
embodiment of being a reluctant player in constitutional politics.  Acting 
with judicial self-restraint, the TCC was sidelined in the arena of 
constitutional politics after the second party turnover in 2008. As a whole,
even though the TCC has continued to hear important constitutional issues in 
the twenty-first century, its normative role has declined. Using Karl 
Loewenstein’s noted distinction between normative and nominal 
constitutions as an analogy,29 this article argues that the TCC has latently 
turned away from its role as an activist and normative facilitator-guardian of 
constitutionalism, devolving into a nominal court in the midst of 
ever-increasing political conflicts. Paralleling the TCC’s tendency towards 
de-judicialization, Taiwan appears to have retreated from judicial 
constitutionalism in favour of a breed of constitutional politics unguided by 
the Constitution through judicial interpretation, thereby casting doubt on the 
stability of its constitutional order.
A note on the article’s methodology is necessary before turning to 
case law analysis. Departing from conventional approaches to studying 
judicial performance in new democracies, which tend to focus on how many 
rulings (or rather, rulings of unconstitutionality) a court has delivered, 
especially in the area of fundamental rights,30 this article engages in a “thick 
description” of the TCC rulings that concern politically charged 
issues. Under this analysis, each case will be closely inspected in light of its 
27 The KMT continued to hold the majority seats of the Parliament (Legislative Yuan) and the 
Presidency in the 2012 elections.
28 In retaliation for Interpretation No. 585, in early 2005 the Pan Blue-controlled Parliament 
attempted to cut off the judicial premium from the emolument paid to the TCC Justices by non-statutory 
means. In this ruling, the TCC effectively set aside the first statute governing the special parliamentary 
committee, which was tasked with the investigation into the so-called 3/19 Incident. This seemingly 
pecuniary dispute was considered a shot across the bow, calling the TCC’s judicial character into 
doubt. The impugned non-statutory means was soon struck down in Interpretation No. 601 (2005).  This 
article will further discuss the constitutional controversies generated by the 3/19 Incident in infra Part 
II.A.2.
29 See Loewenstein, supra note 22.
30 See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary. Or, Why Courts Can Be More 
Democratic Than Parliaments, in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM, supra note 20, at 25.
604 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
pre-referral, post-referral, and post-promulgation political context for three 
reasons.31 First, in light of the TCC’s past record of using interpretations to 
settle political disputes, which “bootstrapped” its legitimacy in playing an 
activist role to the TCC,32 its interpretations in similar cases in recent times 
may indicate its overall current performance. Second, as constitutional 
comparatists have focused on the judicial branch of new democracies as they 
are situated in the volatile political context of democratic transition,33
examining the TCC case law on politically charged issues will engage the 
article’s findings with this broad line of scholarship. Third, a “thick 
description” assesses the effectiveness of the TCC in resolving political 
disputes more effectively than a numerical study, as the former has greater 
ability to tease out the intricacies of constitutional politics in a single 
jurisdiction.34
Apart from Part I, this article comprises of three parts: Part II 
analyzes TCC case law from 2000 to 2016; Part III explains why 
de-judicialization is concerning, as it suggests the withering of constitutional 
normativity; and Part IV summarizes the article’s arguments and briefly 
comments on the constitutional landscape following the presidential election 
in January 2016.   
31 Notably, Clifford Geertz’s method of thick description extends beyond politics to include the 
whole cultural context. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative Theory of 
Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3–30 (1973).   
32 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Bootstrapping, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115, 116–17 (2012) 
(defining the concept of bootstrapping). For a different application of the concept of bootstrapping to the 
context of constituent assemblies, see Jon Elster, Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris,
in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 
(Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994).  The TCC’s most representative bootstrapping interpretation is 
Interpretation No. 261.  See Jiunn-rong Yeh, The Cult of Fatung, supra note 8.
33 See SADURSKI, supra note 2; GINSBURG, supra note 22; RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS:
THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 160–62 (2014); see also Jiunn-rong Yeh, 
supra note 14; Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses in Politically Charged Cases: East Asian 
Experiences, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 885 (2010) [hereinafter Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses].  
34 Cf. HIRSCHL, supra note 33, at 193, 260–68 (referring to research based on “statistical analyses of 
a large number of observations, measurements, data sets, etc.” as “‘large-N’ studies,” and noting that a 
“large-N” study is better at analyzing “world constitutions” than a single case). To map the political
context in which the TCC case law and constitutional politics were situated, this article examines the online 
archive of Taipei Times (an English-language newspaper published in Taipei, available at
http://www.taipeitimes.com) for factual reports. 
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II. DECODING THE MOVE TOWARDS DE-JUDICIALIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S CASE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY
To shed light on the recent tendency towards de-judicialization in 
Taiwan’s constitutional politics, the article shall take a close look at TCC 
case law in the twenty-first century. Section A includes a survey of the case 
law during President Chen’s reign from 2000 to 2008, which indicated signs 
were emerging that the TCC was losing its normative grip on constitutional 
politics in the face of partisan rivalry despite its continued activism. In 
Section B, the article continues to examine the case law following the 
KMT’s return to power in May 2008. The article will show that the move 
towards de-judicialization was completed during the second period, as the 
TCC remained on the sidelines during escalating constitutional conflicts.   
A. An Activist But Failing Court in the Face of Partisan Rivalry:  
2000–2008
In the period from May 20, 2000 to May 19, 2008, the TCC 
promulgated a total of 135 interpretations. 35 128 (95%) of the total 
interpretations concerned constitutional disputes. Among these 
constitutional interpretations, 115 concerned fundamental rights,36 while 13 
resulted from what this article terms “political disputes,” which either 
centered on the competence of departments of constitutional powers 
(especially the Presidency, the Administration, and the Parliament 
(Legislative Yuan)) or affected the relationship between the central 
35 This statistic excludes the nine rulings (from Interpretations No. 499 to No. 507) promulgated 
prior to May 20, 2000, when President Chen was sworn in.  It should be noted that the present selection of 
case law is based on the date of promulgation, although this may not accurately reflect the role the TCC has 
played in constitutional politics as the referral or petition may have been made to the TCC long before the 
case was decided.  This is due to the fact that there is no time limit for cases being decided once they are 
referred or appealed to the TCC.  As the present objective is to assess the role of the TCC in the 
constitutional order through its case law in the twenty-first century,  this article uses the TCC 
interpretations promulgated during the studied period only as the point of access to analyze how they 
played out in constitutional politics.   The discussion of TCC interpretations will thus extend to the 
pre-and post-promulgation political context in which they were situated. See supra note 31 and 
accompanying text.
36 It is noteworthy that many rulings on fundamental rights centered on the issue of legality rather 
than on the underlying value and principle of fundamental rights concerned. See Sean Cooney, The Effects 
of Rule of Law Principles in Taiwan, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 411, 421–23
(Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
606 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
government and local governments. During this period, the TCC continued 
with its activist approach to constitutional disputes. Although the number of 
constitutional cases peaked with a historical high of thirty-four in 1994, the 
TCC remained productive from 2000 to 2008, averaging sixteen 
constitutional interpretations per year during this period.  
Apart from its productivity, the TCC continued to play a part in the 
most contentious political disputes, many of which were attributed to the 
divided government of the DPP controlling the Government (or rather the 
executive power comprising the Presidency and the Administration) and the 
Pan Blue parties dominating the Parliament.37 As noted in the literature, 
almost all conspicuous constitutional controversies were resolved into 
constitutional issues.38 Table 139 indicates that on average, at least one 
intense partisan confrontation was brought before the TCC as a 
constitutional issue in each year of President Chen’s presidency, with the 
number growing during his final two years in office. Considering the time it 
took for the TCC to decide a case, as well as the interval between the genesis 
of a political dispute and its formal referral thereto, there was almost no 
respite in the so-called “democratic civil war.”40 Notably, in most of the 
cases, the TCC did not resort to jurisdictional or procedural grounds to evade 
37 Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 914, 918; Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic 
Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 906-07. Under the so-called semi-presidentialism, both the 
President, the head of state and of Presidency, and the Premier, who leads the Administration, are vested 
with the executive power in the Constitution.  See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., supra note 15, at 127, 
144. This article uses the term “Government” to denote the entirety of the executive power comprising the 
Presidency and the Administration.
38 See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville’s Thesis 
Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485 (2004); Ming-Sung Kuo, Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is 
Judicial Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal Landscape?, 26 CAN. J.L. &
JURIS. 341, 371–72 (2013); Ming-Sung Kuo, Reconciling Constitutionalism with Power: Towards a 
Constitutional Nomos of Political Ordering, 23 RATIO JURIS. 390, 394 (2010). See also Ginsburg, supra 
note 23, at 770–78 (addressing the case of Taiwan).
39 Among the thirteen interpretations that concerned political disputes during the studied period, two 
were about the internal administration of the judicial branch (Interpretations No. 530 and No. 539), while 
one was aimed at harmonizing appointment procedures for the TCC Justices in the wake of the sixth round 
of constitutional revision (Interpretation No. 541).  Due to their limited implications for constitutional 
politics, this article leaves them out of Table 1.  It should be pointed out that the case law listed in Table 1 
includes all interpretations that concerned important political disputes during the period May 20, 2000 to 
March 31, 2016. Ten out of the thirteen cases listed were promulgated by the end of President Chen’s 
tenure.      
40 Michelle Wang, Editorial, The need to fight in our “democratic civil war,” TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 24, 
2007), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2007/12/24/2003393940/1.
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constitutional issues, but rather tackled them head-on.41 Moreover, although 
the TCC seemed to occasionally set out procedural guidelines for different 
branches of government to work out interdepartmental disputes in the future, 
the TCC never failed to take a stand on the immediate issue before it.42
41 Alex Bickel famously noted how the United States Supreme Court may adopt doctrines and 
techniques to decline exercising its jurisdiction. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 127–56, 169–97. 
42 But cf. Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 947–48. 
608 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 25 NO. 3
Table 1: Judicial Yuan Interpretations Concerning Important 








Petitioner Main Constitutional Issues
520 01/15/2001 11/10/2000 Administration Does the Administration have the unilateral power to 
discontinue the construction of the Fourth Nuclear 
Power Plant despite the legislatively-allocated budget 
for that plan? 
543 05/03/2002 12/27/1999 MPs Does the Parliament-approved presidential emergency 
decree allow for further statutory instruments issued by 
the Administration?
550 10/04/2002 03/25/2002 TCG Is it constitutional that the National Health Insurance 
Act provides that local governments contribute to the 
subsidy for premium payable by their registered 
residents for the centrally-administered national health 
insurance program?
553 12/20/2002 05/08/2002 TCG Is it constitutional for the Administration to revoke a 
TCG decision to postpone the statutorily scheduled 
election of its borough wardens?
585 12/15/2004 09/15/2004 MPs (Pan 
Green caucus)
Is the Extraordinary Parliamentary Investigative 
Committee (EPIC) Act, which provides the EPIC with 
broad prosecutorial powers among others, 
constitutional? 
601 07/22/2005 01/25/2005 MPs (Pan 
Green caucus)
Can the Parliament constitutionally cut off the judicial 
allowance from the TCC Justices’ remuneration in 
vetting the annual government budget?
613 07/21/2006 01/20/2006 Administration Are the NCC Act provisions concerning the NCC 
formation constitutional?
627 06/15/2007 01/25/2007 Presidency What is the scope of the presidential immunity? Does 
the President have a state secrets privilege under the 
Constitution?  If so, what is the scope of this 
presidential privilege?
632 08/15/2007 06/16/2005 MPs (Pan 
Green caucus)
Is it constitutional for the Parliament not to exercise its 
consent power over the appointment of ombudsmen?
633 09/28/2007 05/01/2006 MPs (Pan 
Green caucus)
Is the amended EPIC Act unconstitutional?
645 07/11/2008 01/02/2004 MPs (Pan 
Green caucus)
Is the provision in the Referendum Act concerning the 
formation of the RRC constitutional?
729 05/012015 11/29/2013 Administration 
(SPO)
Does the Parliament have the constitutional power to 
access the dossier of criminal cases? 
735 02/04/2016 09/17/2012 MPs (Pan 
Green caucus)
Are the statutory provisions that restrict the introduction 
of no-confidence motions during a special 
parliamentary session constitutional? 
43 I compiled this information from the online official TCC case reports. See Interpretations,
JUSTICES OF THE CONST. COURT, JUD. YUAN, R.O.C, http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/ 
p03.asp (last visited May 7, 2016).  For the case reports in Chinese, see http://www.judicial.gov.tw/ 
constitutionalcourt/p03.asp (last visited May 7, 2016).
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Interpretation No. 520 illustrates this practice of judicial 
activism. The new DPP Administration referred a case to the TCC due to a 
bitter battle with the KMT-dominated Parliament resulting from the 
Administration’s unilateral decision to discontinue the construction of 
Taiwan’s Forth Nuclear Power Plant (the Power Plant) despite a legislatively 
allocated budget for its construction.  The TCC suggested four possible 
solutions, all of which required the challenged decision be subjected to a 
parliamentary vote.44 This decision has been interpreted as evidence of the 
TCC’s strategic reliance on procedure without intervening in 
substance. 45 Yet a closer look at Interpretation No. 520 suggests 
otherwise. First, all of the four seemingly procedural solutions were 
premised on the compulsory character of the legislatively approved annual 
government budget. Even the Administration appointed by the newly 
elected President Chen, who had pledged to stop the construction of the 
Power Plant in his election manifesto, had no unilateral power to amend the 
annual government budget by selective execution. Apart from the first 
suggestion, that the Administration dutifully accept the contrary 
parliamentary resolution and resume the Power Plant’s construction, the 
other three solutions all led to the conclusion that the Administration had to 
concede in the face of parliamentary opposition.46 This case illustrates the 
TCC’s aggressive approach to resolving political disputes, holding a firm 
grip on other constitutional powers.
Yet while it is one thing to say that the TCC continued to be an 
activist court, it is another to conclude that the TCC remained an effective 
institutional arbitrator of political disputes. To determine whether the TCC 
44 J.Y. Interpretation No. 520 (Const. Ct. Jan. 15, 2001), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno= 520.
45 See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 947. 
46 Under the second solution, the Premier would have to resign. Yet this does not suggest that her 
replacement could disregard the parliamentary resolution concerned. Regarding the third solution, the 
Parliament could further pass a motion of no confidence, forcing the President to accept the Premier’s 
resignation or to dissolve the Parliament.  Notably, the President could have elected to dissolve the 
Parliament with the hope that the electorate would return a new Parliament in support of his election 
pledge.  Nevertheless, this only vindicated the binding force of the parliamentary resolution vis-à-vis the 
Administration.  The fourth solution went beyond the execution of the Parliament-approved annual 
budget.  While the Administration had no unilateral power to selectively execute the annual budget, it was 
under no constitutional obligation to continue to finance the Power Plant plan in the future budget bill.  
The fourth solution suggested that should the Parliament wish to see the plan, however, the Parliament 
would have to provide for the completion of the Power Plant in legislation, which would compel the 
Administration to carry out and finance this legal requirement.  J.Y. Interpretation No. 520 (Const. Ct. 
Jan. 15, 2001).   
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succeeded in maintaining its status as a normative court by settling political 
disputes during the relevant period, this article analyzes the cases listed in 
Table 1 in light of the broader political context. This article first takes up 
the TCC rulings on the political disputes during Chen’s first term.  
1. Shining (Dimmer) Under Gathering Political Storm Clouds: 
2000–2004
A quick look at Table 1 reveals that among the four interpretations 
promulgated during President Chen’s first term, Interpretation No. 543 was 
petitioned to the TCC by the Members of the Parliament (MPs, also known 
as Legislators) during the former President Lee’s tenure. Although it 
involved an important constitutional question concerning the exercise of the 
presidential emergency power provided for in Amendment 2, Section 3 of 
the Constitution, the ruling did not elicit a reaction, as more than two years 
had passed since the challenged administrative regulations added to the 
original presidential emergency decree. In contrast, the listed interpretations 
concerning political disputes that originated during President Chen’s 
two-term presidency, including the three cases that will be discussed in this 
part, were more complicated than the constitutional issues in Interpretation 
No. 543.47 Let us begin by taking a second look at the aforementioned 
Interpretation No. 520.
As suggested above, Interpretation No. 520, by all appearances, 
concerned whether the Administration had the unilateral power to selectively 
execute the annual government budget approved by the Parliament. In 
addition, the decision appeared to provide procedural guidance on the 
solution to the then-existing political gridlock.48 After the TCC’s decision, 
the Premier and the Parliament Speaker made a joint public statement that 
the Power Plant construction would be immediately resumed.49 Based on 
these outward signs, the TCC appeared to have successfully resolved the 
political deadlock between the Administration and the Parliament. Yet what 
triggered Interpretation No. 520 was more than a disagreement over the 
execution of an annual budget between the Administration and the 
47 The formulation in Table 1 is an adaptation of the official English version of the Judicial Yuan 
Interpretations. 
48 Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 935–36, 947.
49 See Joyce Huang & Lin Chieh-yu, Government gives in on power plant, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 14, 
2001), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/02/14/0000073591.
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Parliament. The growing political divisiveness following the inauguration 
of President Chen underlay the confrontation, which provides an alternate 
basis for analyzing Interpretation No. 520.
After winning the presidential election unexpectedly on March 18, 
2000, then President-elect (and a member of the DPP) Chen Shui-bian soon 
announced the formation of an all-inclusive “people’s government” and 
suggested that Mr. Tang Fei, a long-time KMT member and four-star 
general, would be his choice for the Premier. This proposal was not 
received positively by the DPP’s supporters,50 while the Pan Blue did not 
reject the idea of a “people’s government” outright.51 Aspiring to create 
partisanship-free politics, President Chen appointed Mr. Tang as the Premier 
when he was sworn in on May 20, while simultaneously rejecting the 
KMT’s demand to increase ties with the DPP in the 
Administration.52 Initially the experiment of the “people’s government” was 
well received by the public, and the Pan Green and Pan Blue managed to 
maintain a working relationship.53 Yet signs emerged that an unbridgeable 
divide existed between President Chen and Premier Tang over the Power 
Plant controversy. With the divide widening, Premier Tang resigned on 
October 3, 2000, ending Chen’s 137-day “people’s government” 
experiment.54 To carry out his election pledge, Chen turned to his DPP 
comrade Mr. Chang Chun-hsiung, who formed a minority Administration 
and later announced the discontinuation of the Power Plant plan on October 
27. 55 In reaction, the KMT decided to escalate the confrontation by 
boycotting all of the government bills and threatening to recall Chen from 
50 Liu Shao-Hua, Is the choice of Tang Fei a compromise too far?, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 31, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/03/31/0000030352.
51 Initially, the KMT was not opposed to the appointment of a KMT member as Premier, expecting 
that it could dominate the Administration with its parliamentary majority.  Yet President Chen was not 
interested in forming a formal coalition Administration underpinned by an inter-party agreement.  After 
his rejection of a KMT-dominated Administration, the KMT’s attitude towards the Premier-designate Tang 
gradually changed from reluctant acceptance to boycott.  Lin Chieh-yu, DPP says Cabinet is not the place 
for factionalism, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 31, 2000), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/03/ 
31/0000030350.
52 Irene Lin, Chen stands tough on Cabinet choices, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 1, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/04/01/0000030570.
53 Monique Chu, Poll gives Tang and Tsai high performance marks, TAIPEI TIMES (July 29, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archives/2000/07/29/000004570
54 Joyce Huang & Lin Chieh-yu, Tang bows out with president’s blessing, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 4, 
2000), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/10/04/0000055924.
55 Joyce Huang, Cabinet pulls plug on power plant, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 28, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/10/28/0000058926.
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office, virtually bringing the entire Government to a halt.56 Against the 
backdrop of this heated partisan battle, the Administration referred the 
dispute to the TCC.
It is true that the political gridlock was indeed unblocked after the 
promulgation of Interpretation No. 520 on January 15, 2001. Nevertheless, 
it fell far short of resolving the political issues underlying the constitutional 
dispute. On January 31, the KMT-controlled Parliament resolved to 
immediately resume the Power Plant construction by a vote of 135 to 70 
with only a few abstentions, forcing the Administration to abandon President 
Chen’s campaign pledge.57 The working relationship between the KMT-led 
Pan Blue and the DPP-led Pan Green was never restored, and the idea of 
partisanship-free new politics was abandoned. Instead, as demonstrated by 
subsequent cases, Interpretation No. 520 emboldened the parliamentary 
majority KMT, who found a constitutional citadel in the Parliament in its 
political confrontation with the DPP Government that would plunge the 
constitutional order into constant turmoil.  
It is no surprise that the Parliament was not the only theater of 
partisan conflict during this period. Rather, after the KMT lost the 
presidential election, the Taipei City Government (TCG) became another 
rallying ground with Mr. Ma Ying-Jeou, who had unseated the 
incumbent Chen Shui-bian in a landslide mayoral election in 1998, rising as 
a counterweight to the DPP Government.58 Situated in this broad political 
context, both Interpretations No. 550 and 553 concerned more than the 
constitutional division of powers between the central government and the 
local governments. On its surface, Interpretation No. 550 addressed whether 
56 Lin Mei-chun, KMT moves to recall the president, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 31, 2000),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2000/10/31/0000059288.
57 Lin Mei-chun, Uncertainty hangs in the air after vote, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb 01, 2001), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2001/02/01/0000071850. The Pan Blue-sponsored 
motion included the commitment to a nuclear power-free homeland in the future, which had been a 
loner-term DPP plank. It was later included in the Environment Basic Law. Yet it left unaddressed the 
timeline of phasing out the existing three nuclear power plants. It is also noteworthy that Interpretation No. 
520 fell far short of settling the controversy over the Power Plant as it had been the flash point of political 
conflict ever since, until the KMT Government decided to give up on its completion under the enormous 
public pressure sparked by the former DPP leader Mr. Lin I-hsiung’s week-long hunger strike in April 
2014. Shih Hsiu-chuan, Government will never axe plant: Jiang, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 29, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/ archives/2001/02/01/0000071850.
58 Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations in a Contested Constitutional Democracy: The 
Case of Taiwan, in CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS IN ASIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS 37, 50–51 (Andrew 
Harding & Mark Sidel eds., 2015) [hereinafter Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations].
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a statutory demand on local governments to make financial contributions to 
the centrally administered national health insurance was constitutional.59 In 
Interpretation No. 553, the Administration’s revocation of a TCG decision to 
postpone the statutorily scheduled election of its subordinate li executive 
officers (borough wardens)60 was at issue.61 In the former, the TCC ruled 
that the challenged statutory demand was constitutional, but it advised the 
central government to consult local governments when imposing statutory 
financial burdens on them in the future. In the latter, the TCC stated that the 
Administration had the legal power to review the TCG’s decision in the 
administration of its local elections, but did not address the legality of the 
Administration’s revocation as the issue fell within the jurisdiction of 
administrative courts. 62 Evidently, Interpretation No. 553 suggested the 
TCC’s embrace of the Bickelian “passive virtues.”63 It is also noteworthy 
that that the seemingly evasive Interpretation No. 553 was decided less than 
three months after the promulgation of Interpretation No. 550, which 
resulted in the TCG’s pursuance of further legal consideration as Ma was 
seeking mayoral re-election in 2002.64 Even though Ma had won a landslide 
victory less than two weeks prior and the TCC invoked passive virtues,65
59 J.Y. Interpretation No. 550 (Const. Ct. Oct. 4, 2002), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno =550. 
60 A li is a borough, whose elected executive officer, the warden, is the lowest-level official in the 
statutory provision for the local self-government in Taiwan.
61 J.Y. Interpretation No. 553 (Const. Ct. Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno =553.
62 For a more complete summary of both interpretations, see Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local 
Relations, supra note 58, at 51–53.  The TCC has jurisdiction over the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions and judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances, as well as the 
impeachment of the President and the Vice President.  Moreover, it is tasked with issuing so-called 
“uniform interpretations” of statutes and ordinances.  Over non-constitutional public law cases, the 
Supreme Administrative Court has the final say. Criminal and civil law matters belong to the jurisdiction 
of the so-called ordinary courts comprising a Supreme Court, several high courts, and dozens of district 
courts. The TCC has no appellate jurisdiction over the rulings of the Supreme Administrative Court and 
the Supreme Court. See Wen-Chen Chang, Gradual Transformation, supra note 3, at 147–48.    
63 The concept of passive virtues was made famous by Alex Bickel. In terms of counter-majoritarian 
difficulty facing the judicial power, he argued that the court should avoid exercising its power of judicial 
review by resorting to jurisdictional grounds when possible. See BICKEL, supra note 13, at 199–200.
64 Editorial, Justices give Ma reason to shutter, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 6, 2002), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2002/10/06/0000171004. Rather than engaging in 
dialogue with the central government, the TCG elected to fight a long legal battle, which ended in a 
Supreme Administrative Court ruling in favor of the central government in 2009.  But the TCG continued 
to defy court rulings.  In any event this issue was politically settled after Ma was elected President in 
2008.  Shih Hsiu-chuan, Insurance debt to be resolved, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 9, 2009),  
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/08/09/2003450701.
65 See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations, supra note 58, at 53.
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Interpretation No. 553’s affirmation of the Administration’s power to review 
the TCG’s decision further antagonized the TCG.66 Eventually, the DPP 
Administration was unable to recover the unpaid dues the TCG owed on the 
national health insurance during Ma’s eight-year mayoral tenure.67
Read together, Interpretations No. 550 and No. 553 show the TCC’s 
reluctance to interpose itself in the political chess game between Mayor 
Ma’s TCG and President Chen’s Government, but it did not shy away from 
taking a firm stand on constitutional principles. 68 Even so, the two 
interpretations not only left the wounded relationship between the central 
and the local governments unhealed, but also failed to resolve the issue at 
hand as the TCG continued to ignore its statutory duty. If the case law 
during President Chen’s first term suggests that the TCC continued shining 
in the period between 2000 and 2004, would the TCC’s constitutional light 
shine even brighter in the second half of Chen’s presidency when political 
storm clouds were gathering?  It is to this theme this article now turns. 
2. Standing Against Partisan Whirlwinds: 2004–2008
While political stand-off characterized the relationship between the 
Pan Blue and the Pan Green during the first term of the DPP Government, 
constitutional brinkmanship dominated the political landscape after 
President Chen was re-elected by a razor-thin margin on May 20, 
2004. Expecting an uphill battle in the lead-up to the presidential election, 
President Chen in January 2004 decided to hold a parallel referendum under 
the recently enacted Referendum Act, despite parliamentary 
objections. 69 The thinking behind this controversial decision was to 
galvanize the pro-independence Pan Green supporters by using a referendum 
to remind voters of the DPP’s long-held goal of an independent Taiwan due 
to its implications of self-determination.70 Yet what made President Chen’s 
66 Jimmy Chuang et al., Borough-warden vote not our concern, say justices, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2002), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2002/12/21/0000187995.
67 For a discussion, explanation, and summary of how this long-standing controversy ended, see Shih 
Hsiu-chuan & Loa Iok-sin, DOH budget unlocked to pay health fees, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 18, 2010), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2010/12/18/2003491261.
68 But see Jiunn-rong Yeh, Evolving Central-local Relations, supra note 58, at 52, 53.
69 Huang Tai-lin, Opposition calls referendum ‘illegal, a joke’, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan 18, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/01/18/2003091791.
70 The referendum included two questions, both of which only tenuously touched on Taiwan’s 
political identity. While the referendum failed to pass the high threshold to be legally binding, it was seen 
to have successfully mobilized the DPP’s supporters in the presidential election. See Mily Ming-Tzu Kao, 
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re-election toxically divisive was an assassination attempt on the eve of the 
presidential election (the so-called “3/19 Incident”) during which both 
President Chen and his running mate were wounded. The DPP’s electoral 
victory was attributed to the 3/19 Incident, as the party allegedly garnered a 
substantial number of sympathy votes. Upon the completion of the 
vote-counting process, the Pan Blue rejected the result and accused the DPP 
of staging the assassination attempt, setting up a long battle that haunted 
President Chen’s second term.71 As part of its attempt to challenge the 
legitimacy of President Chen’s presidency (which also included litigation 
challenging the validity of the presidential election and mass protests), the 
majority Pan Blue passed a special law that created an extraordinary 
parliamentary investigative committee (EPIC), which was equipped with 
broad prosecutorial powers to discover the “truth” of the 3/19 
Incident.72 This set the stage for the long tripartite constitutional saga 
comprising of Interpretations No. 585, No. 601, and No. 633, which lasted 
from 2004 to 2007 as President Chen’s second term was winding down.   
No sooner had the law creating EPIC (EPIC Act) come into effect on 
September 24, 2004 than the Pan Green MPs petitioned the TCC to issue an 
injunctive order, arguing it encroached on the executive’s constitutional 
powers. 73 The TCC did not respond to the plea for an injunction 
immediately, and meanwhile the DPP Administration ordered all civil 
servants to ignore any request or order from the EPIC.74 On December 15, 
the TCC promulgated Interpretation No. 585 (EPIC I), circumscribing the 
scope of the parliamentary investigation vis-à-vis the executive privilege of 
non-disclosure, and striking down several crucial provisions of the EPIC 
Act. The EPIC investigation was immediately brought to a halt.75 Infuriated 
by this ruling, the Pan Blue-controlled Parliament cut off the judicial 
premium from the TCC Justices’ remuneration in January 2005 during the 
The Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?, 44 ASIAN SURV. 591, 
593–95, 598 (2004).
71 Huang Tai-lin, Lien calls election unfair, demands a recount, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 21, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/03/21/2003107202.
72 Debby Wu & Ko Shu-ling, “Monstrous” bill horrifies Cabinet, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 25, 2004),
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2004/08/25/2003200116.
73 J.Y. Interpretation No. 585 (Const. Ct. Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=585.
74 Jimmy Chuang, Officials cite law’s many anomalies, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 10, 2004), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/10/10/2003206280.
75 Jimmy Chuang, Court reduces powers of 319 committee, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 16, 2004), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/12/16/2003215297.
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non-statutory process of vetting the annual government budget. 76 This 
blatant political revenge was unprecedented.  Being a pecuniary dispute on 
the surface, this non-statutory parliamentary move was a stern warning, 
challenging the TCC’s judicial character.77 In response, the Pan Green MPs 
petitioned the TCC shortly after and the TCC issued Interpretation No. 601 
in response to this budget manipulation. The superficially technical change 
to the annual government budget was invalidated outright not only for its 
violation of the constitutional ban on any non-statutory reduction of the 
remuneration of the judiciary, but also for its negative implications on 
judicial independence.78
Pushed back by the TCC, the Pan Blue soon ceased its attack on the 
TCC, but did not relent on its refutation of the legitimacy of Chen’s 
presidency.  Responding reluctantly to Interpretation No. 585, the Pan 
Blue-dominated Parliament amended the condemned provisions of the EPIC 
Act with the hope that the EPIC would be brought back to life in order to 
prove that President Chen’s re-election was the work of the DPP’s political 
machinations. 79 Interpretation No. 633 (EPIC II) was promulgated on 
September 28, 2007, over sixteen months after the Pan Green referred the 
amended EPIC Act to the TCC for its violation of the constitutional 
provisions on the separation of powers. Although the TCC affirmed most of 
the challenged provisions, it rendered the restructured EPIC effectively 
impotent by invalidating the crucial stipulation that the EPIC had the power 
to transfer civil servants to its command without the Administration’s 
consent.80 It was no surprise that the Pan Blue subsequently accused the 
activist TCC of taking sides with the Pan Green, but it took its partisan fight 
to the electoral battleground as the parliamentary election was just 
three-and-a-half months away.81 Moreover, the Pan Blue sensed that the 
76 Jimmy Chuang, Judiciary “disappointed,” TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 22, 2005), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/taiwan/archives/2005/01/22/2003220461.
77 WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., supra note 15, at 386–87.
78 J.Y. Interpretation 601 (Const. Ct. July 22, 2005), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=601.
79 Shih Hsiu-chuan & Jewel Huang, Shooting Amendment Passed by Legislature, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 
12, 2006), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/04/12/2003302264.
80 J.Y. Interpretation No. 633 (Const. Ct. Sept. 28, 2007), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=633.
81 Jimmy Chuang & Flora Wang, 319 clauses unconstitutional: judges, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2007), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/09/29/2003380893. A notable coincident 
was that the Parliament rejected half of President Chen’s nominees for the TCC Justices the day before.
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political winds were shifting, with the KMT-nominated Ma Ying-Jeou 
emerging as the favorite in the next presidential election set to be held in less 
than six months.82 Taken together, the TCC failed to resolve the controversy 
resulting from the 2004 presidential election even with the resounding 
constitutional trio of Interpretations No. 585, No. 601, and No. 633.
The partisan rivalry between the Pan Blue and the Pan Green 
extended to the issue of controlling independent regulatory 
agencies. Inspired by the United States’ experience with independent 
regulatory commissions, such as the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), scholars of 
communications in Taiwan had long advocated for the establishment of an 
independent National Communications Commission (NCC). The NCC 
would be tasked with regulating the telecommunications industry and 
protecting mass media from falling under the sway of government 
authorities (including the military) or political parties. 83 Yet when the 
proposal to create the NCC was brought to the foreground, the political 
landscape was increasingly partisan. Losing control of the Government, the 
KMT intended to hold onto its remaining influence over mass media out of 
fear that it might lose more ground to the Pan Green. Thus, control over the 
prospective NCC became another contentious issue in the long partisan 
struggle.
In 2005, as part of its comprehensive government reorganization plan, 
the Administration introduced its legislative bill for the creation of the NCC
to Parliament. The DPP Administration and the Pan Green in the Parliament 
clashed with the parliamentary majority Pan Blue over the NCC’s 
formation. To secure its influence over mass media, the Pan Blue defeated 
the FCC-inspired government bill and passed its own draft legislative bill.84
Under the Pan Blue-sanctioned NCC Act, the formation of the NCC, which 
would comprise of thirteen commissioners, was essentially placed under the 
parliamentary auspices. Basically, the appointment of the commissioners 
Shih Hsiu-chuan, Four grand justices approved, four rejected, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 28, 2007), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/09/28/2003380727.  
82 Editorial, Frank Hsieh runs the gauntlet, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 24, 2008), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2008/01/24/2003398624.
83 See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Experimenting with Independent Commissions in a New Democracy with a 
Civil Law Tradition: The Case of Taiwan, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 246 (Susan 
Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2010).
84 Id.
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would proceed in three stages. In the first stage of recommendation, the 
Administration could only recommend three candidates, while the 
Parliament would make fifteen recommendations allocated in proportion to 
the parliamentary seats each party held. Following the first stage, all 
eighteen candidates would be subject to a vetting process overseen and 
administered by a Parliament-appointed expert committee, whose eleven 
appointees were again allocated in proportion to each party’s parliamentary 
seats. Only after the second stage of vetting did the Premier’s constitutional 
power of appointment come into play: in the third stage, which involved 
multiple steps, the Premier would choose his nominees for the 
commissionership from the vetted candidates and then sign the order of 
appointment if his nominees received parliamentary consent.85 In all, this 
process stripped the Premier of his influence over the membership of the 
NCC as his appointment power, which lay at the core of the executive 
power, was rendered nominal.  
As was expected, the Administration referred the NCC Act to the 
TCC, claiming the Act encroached upon the core executive power of 
appointment, and requested an injunctive order in January 2006; the 
formation of the first NCC had already begun according to the foregoing
procedure.86 Corresponding to its approach to the controversy over the 
EPIC, the TCC did not respond to the Administration’s plea for an 
injunction. It was not until six months later that the TCC ruled against the 
Parliament in Interpretation No. 613, declaring part of the NCC Act 
unconstitutional.87 It is noteworthy that the TCC postponed the effect of its 
declaration of unconstitutionality until the end of 2008, almost a year and a 
half after the NCC Act was promulgated. It is true that the TCC frequently 
postpones the effect of its declarations of unconstitutionality by setting a 
time limit on the repeal of the disputed legislation.88 Still, in terms of the 
immediate impact of the NCC on the regulation of mass media, it is 
remarkable that the TCC set such a long time limit, as it allowed for the 
NCC’s continuing operation beyond President Chen’s tenure. Moreover, 
departing from its approach to setting a time limit in the case law, the TCC 
85 J.Y. Interpretation No. 613 (Const. Ct. July 21, 2006), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=613.
86 Ko Shu-ling, Lawmakers reach consensus on nominees for NCC, TAIPEI TIMES, (Dec. 29, 2005), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/12/29/2003286481.
87 J.Y. Interpretation No. 613, supra note 85.
88 See WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA, supra note 15, at 454–56.
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was explicit that the validity of all decisions taken by the “unconstitutional” 
NCC would be unaffected.89 In result, Interpretation No. 613 acquiesced to 
the Pan Blue’s sway over the constitutionality of the NCC, even though it 
declared part of the NCC Act unconstitutional.  
Notably, President Chen, his family, and many DPP officials had been 
embroiled in a number of conspicuous scandals beginning in the second half 
of 2005. When Interpretation No. 613 was promulgated in July 2006, 
President Chen was already at the center of a series of corruption and 
international money-laundering accusations, leading to the Red Shirt Army’s 
mass protest in September. In light of this tumultuous political environment, 
the unusual aspects of Interpretation No. 613 were an indication that the 
TCC conceded fait accompli in the endgame of the DPP Government, 
despite its ostensibly activist stance on constitutional principles. Acting on 
the TCC-set timeframe, the Pan Blue could simply wait until after the 
upcoming elections to reassert its active influence on the NCC in alternative 
ways following its expected electoral wins.90 The political maelstrom that 
engulfed the entire DPP Government also set the perfect stage for 
Interpretation No. 627. 
On the surface, Interpretation No. 627 primarily concerned the scope 
of presidential immunity, as provided for in Article 52 of the Constitution, 
and the so-called “state secrets privilege.” The underlying dispute was a 
prosecutorial investigation into allegations of embezzlement and other 
crimes against President Chen, First Lady Wu Shu-chen, and a number of 
their aides. Article 52 stipulates that the sitting President shall not be subject 
to any criminal prosecution, trial, or punishment for any crimes other than 
treason.91 Yet it was unclear whether the sitting president was also immune 
89 J.Y. Interpretation No. 613, supra note 85.
90 Expecting an electoral win, the Pan Blue-controlled Parliament did amend the provision governing 
the NCC’s formation in response to Interpretation No. 613 in late December just three weeks away from the 
parliamentary election.  Flora Wang, Cabinet assumes control over the NCC, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 21, 
2007), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/12/21/2003393407. Even so, new 
commissioners were not appointed according to the amended procedure until after the KMT’s return to 
power on May 20, 2008.  The commissioners, who were appointed in accordance with the 
unconstitutional NCC Act, remained in office until August 1, 2008. Shelley Shan, NCC Inaugurates 
Bonnie Peng as new chairwoman, TAIPEI TIMES ( Aug. 2, 2008), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
taiwan/archives/2008/08/02/2003419232.
91 Article 52 provides “The President shall not, without having been recalled, or having been relieved 
of his functions, be liable to criminal prosecution unless he is charged with having committed an act of 
rebellion or treason.” TAIWAN CONST. art. 52.
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from other criminal proceedings such as the pre-indictment prosecutorial 
investigation implicating President Chen. Initially, he voluntarily subjected 
himself to the prosecutorial investigation concerning the First Lady’s and 
her alleged accomplices’ suspected crimes in mid-2006. However, when the 
formal indictment issued on November 3, 2006 intimated President Chen’s 
involvement, he questioned whether the prosecutor had subjected him to 
constitutionally-forbidden criminal proceedings. 92 Moreover, President 
Chen asserted the state secrets privilege and requested that the trial court 
(the Taipei City District Court) suppress several seized documents offered as 
evidence against the First Lady and her co-defendants. The privilege was 
asserted despite the documents not being classified in accordance with the 
State Secrets Protection Act. 93 As the trial continued, the Presidency 
referred these issues to the TCC in January 2007,94 and later, in March,
requested an injunction on the trial of the First Lady and her 
co-defendants.95
Again, the TCC did not respond immediately to the Presidency’s 
request for injunctive relief. In mid-June, the TCC issued Interpretation No. 
627 and ruled that an unwritten state secrets privilege could be inferred from 
the president’s constitutional roles, such as commander-in-chief of the 
armed forces and other executive roles, as the Presidency had contended.96
Moreover, the TCC suggested that what would be classified under the State 
Secrets Protection Act was not coterminous with the scope of the 
presidential state secrets privilege, but rather an instance thereof.97
92 Rich Chang, Wu indicted, Chen to come, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 4, 2006), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2006/11/04/2003334732 [hereinafter Rich Chang, Wu 
Indicted].
93 Rich Chang, Judge orders “fund” files opened by Tuesday, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 20, 2007), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/01/20/2003345553.
94 It is noteworthy that the TCC rejected an early referral made by the DDP MPs with respect to the 
same issue on January 25, 2007.  Yet on the same day, the Presidency made another emergency referral to 
the TCC.  Rich Chang et al., Grand justices toss out DPP request, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 26, 2007), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/01/26/2003346357. 
95 J.Y. Interpretation No. 627 (Const. Ct. June 15, 2007), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=613.http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/C
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Initially, this appeared to give President Chen significant leverage in 
his legal battle. Moreover, echoing United States v. Nixon, 98 the TCC 
conflated the common law evidentiary rule of the state secrets privilege with 
the constitutional doctrine of the executive privilege, extending its 
application beyond private litigation.99 Nonetheless, beneath the surface of 
the TCC’s decision creating an unwritten constitutional doctrine of a general 
state privilege, the TCC also rendered an absolute privilege 
justiciable. While the President was entitled to invoke this constitutional 
“privilege” in the criminal proceedings, such a plea would be subject to 
judicial review, even if the standard of scrutiny would be the less exacting 
reasonableness review.100 In other words, under Interpretation No. 627, the 
President was only entitled to a qualified reviewable right, not a privilege 
outright.101 With no existing legal framework for reviewing state secrets 
claims, the TCC stated that disputes over the President’s invocation of the 
state secrets privilege in judicial proceedings would be heard by an ad hoc 
tribunal of five sitting appellate judges convened with the Taiwan High 
Court (THC).102 Paralleling its assertion of judicial control of the state 
secrets privilege, it interpreted Article 52 restrictively: except for the 
purpose of tolling the statute of limitations, prosecutors were prohibited 
from naming the sitting President as a defendant, and thus the sitting 
President was immune from any targeted investigation and other criminal 
proceedings. 103 Notably, the latter stipulation did not apply to 
pre-indictment prosecutorial investigations which could incidentally 
implicate the sitting President in cases with others named as defendants. Yet 
98 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
99 Given that the executive privilege is invoked when the executive power clashes with other
departments of constitutional power, it is qualified and justiciable. Yet the Nixon Court also discussed
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), which has been viewed as converting the common law 
evidentiary rule of the state secrets privilege into a constitutional doctrine, in the context of the executive 
claim of non-disclosure vis-à-vis other coordinate branches in criminal proceedings. It is not clear if it 
further suggests softening the absolute nature of the state secrets privilege in private litigation. See
William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 92–93, 
98–100 (2005).
100 See Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 890–91.
101 For a discussion on the distinction between the absolute state secrets privilege and the qualified 
executive privilege, see Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 99, at 92, 100.
102 See Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 889.
103 Id. at 888–89.
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this was exactly the case that prompted President Chen to bring a 
constitutional challenge.104
Ostensibly, Interpretation No. 627 seemed to strike a balance between 
presidential executive power and the integrity of criminal proceedings by 
stating constitutional principles.105 To this end, it further provided for an 
institutional framework within which the foregoing conflicting values could 
be balanced in individual cases. However, the subsequent responses from 
other constitutional actors rendered Interpretation No. 627 irrelevant. In the 
immediate wake of Interpretation No. 627, President Chen pleaded with the 
trial court to return the seized evidentiary documents, as they were protected 
as state secrets. Receiving no response for over two months, he 
retrospectively classified those documents according to the State Secrets 
Protection Act in September 2007 and continued to request that the trial 
court return them. In October, the trial court defiantly declared President 
Chen’s retrospective classification unlawful and rejected his constitutional 
claim of the state secrets privilege, in spite of the TCC’s ruling that such 
claims be decided by an ad hoc tribunal of five sitting appellate judges with 
the THC.106 This decision added even more complexity to the legal saga, 
which was ultimately decided by the Supreme Court on May 7, 2009 when it 
affirmed a THC ruling issued by a three-judge panel in mid-February 2009: 
Interpretation No. 627 was simply inapplicable.107 By the time the Supreme 
104 Rich Chang, Wu Indicted, supra note 92.
105 Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 899. 
106 Rich Chang, Court rejects Chen’s request for return of documents, TAIPEI TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/10/06/2003381908.
107 Following the trial court’s preliminary ruling on his state secrets claim, President Chen appealed 
the ruling to the THC in accordance with the Criminal Procedure Code, resulting in a judicial ping-pong
between the Supreme Court and the THC: rescind and remand rulings, redeterminations, and 
(re)appeals. To make a long story short, each issued four rulings on President Chen’s appeals. Notably, in 
its first two rulings, the THC convened an ad hoc five-member tribunal to decide the claim in accordance 
with Interpretation No. 627.  Yet in its ruling on June 26, 2008, the Supreme Court revoked the THC’s 
second ruling and remanded it to the THC with the instruction that the THC apply the Criminal Procedure 
Code instead of the Interpretation No. 627-directed stopgap measure, as Chen’s retrospective classification 
was unlawful and Interpretation No. 627 applied only to lawful claims of state secrets privilege.  
Accordingly, the THC ruled against then ex-President Chen by a three-judge panel on July 14, 2008 when 
Chen had already been under investigation.  Chen continued to appeal even after President Ma’s 
annulment of his decision to classify the evidentiary documents at issue.  Although the Supreme Court 
later rescinded and remanded the THC’s July 14, 2008 ruling for legal technicalities at the end of 2008, it 
did not reopen the question of whether the THC should determine the claim with an ad hoc five-judge 
tribunal as alluded to in Interpretation No. 627, or with an ordinary three-judge panel as provided for in the 
Criminal Procedure Code.  The THC ruled against Mr. Chen’s moot plea for returning the documents 
concerned with a three-judge panel on February 16, 2009, a decision which was appealed again.  The 
JUNE 2016 Taiwan’s Constitutional Politics 623
Court issued its decision, Mr. Chen had stepped down almost one year 
earlier and had already been taken into custody.108 Four months later, he 
was convicted on charges of corruption and other crimes.109
The Supreme Court and the lower courts were not the only 
constitutional actors that contributed to neutralizing Interpretation No. 
627. While the TCC recognized presidential discretion by categorizing it 
under the State Secrets Protection Act as an instance of the constitutional 
state secrets privilege, the newly-inaugurated President Ma of the KMT 
annulled his predecessor’s decision on secret classification in early August, 
2008.110 With regard to the legal framework governing the review of state 
secretes claims to which the TCC alluded, the new Pan Blue-controlled 
Parliament simply ignored this part of the TCC’s decision. The TCC may 
have sung in unison in a maximalist style in Interpretation No. 627 as it tried 
to step into the void with the stopgap institutional framework while working 
to bring the three major constitutional powers together on the administration 
of state secrets. 111 In light of subsequent developments, however, 
Interpretation No. 627 only indicated how helpless the TCC was in the midst 
of unrelenting partisan rivalry.112
The last case decided during Chen’s Presidency examined by this 
article, Interpretation No. 632, epitomizes the toxic partisanship present
throughout his second term. To begin with, it was promulgated in August 
2007, when the DPP Government was plunged into the political whirlwinds 
noted above, but the political dispute that led to the ruling could be traced 
back to 2004, soon after President Chen was sworn in for his second 
Supreme Court closed the legal saga with its May 7, 2009 decision. All the rulings mentioned above are
available at http://jirs.judicial.gov.tw/FJUD/HISTORYSELF.aspx?SwitchFrom=1&selectedOwner=H&
selectedCrmyy=096&selectedCrmid=%E6%8A%97&selectedCrmno=001181&selectedCrtid=TPH.
108 Rich Chang & Ko Shu-ling, Court backflips, detains Chen Shui-bian, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 31, 
2008), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/12/31/2003432521.
109 The subsequent legal battles surrounding Mr. Chen’s corruption verdict and other charges, his 
sentence and imprisonment, and his release on medical parole are beyond the scope of this article.  
110 Ko Shu-ling, Presidential Office opens Chen files, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 7, 2008), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/08/07/2003419645.
111 See Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 900–02, 905–06. Compared 
to what Cass Sunstein famously terms “judicial minimalism,” the TCC’s attempt to create an institutional 
stopgap was nothing but maximalist. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM 
ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
112 But see Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33, at 900 (contending that 
“the [TCC] itself is the biggest winner”). 
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term.113 Under the Constitution, the Ombudsmanship (also known as the 
Control Yuan), a collegiate body of twenty-nine ombudsmen, is one of the 
five coordinate departments of constitutional powers alongside the 
Presidency.  The Constitution provides that the President appoints 
ombudsmen with parliamentary consent. 114 President Chen did not 
nominate his choices for new ombudsmen until December 20, 2004, when 
the Parliament returned to the lame-duck session after the parliamentary 
election on December 11; the election had given the DPP the most seats but 
delivered the Pan Blue parliamentary majority.115 At that time, the end of 
the Third Ombudsmanship (January 31, 2005) was only six weeks 
away. Despite the tight timeline, the lame-duck Parliament deviated from 
the parliamentary rules and put the nomination on hold until the end of the 
parliamentary term on January 31, 2005. After the new Parliament opened 
on February 1, President Chen re-sent his nomination on April 4, while the 
ombudsmen had already left office for over two months. The Pan 
Blue-controlled Parliament continued to hold the nomination by means of 
parliamentary rules. To break the deadlock, the Pan Green MPs referred the 
case to the TCC in June.116
The TCC did not respond until August 2007, after the 
Ombudsmanship had already been left defunct for over thirty months. In 
Interpretation No. 632, the TCC declared that the Parliament’s deliberate 
inaction amounted to a failure to carry out its constitutional duty. It also 
noted that both the President and the Parliament should properly fulfill their 
constitutional role by making a timely nomination and holding a vote 
without deliberate delay concerning the Ombudsmanship. 117 While 
Interpretation No. 632 stood firm on constitutional principles and even took 
the parliamentary inaction to task, it stopped short of pointing a clear way 
out of the political gridlock, such as by setting a deadline for an up-or-down 
113 J.Y. Interpretation No. 632 (Const. Ct. Aug 15, 2007), http://www.judicial.gov.tw
/constitutionalcourt/EN/p03_01.asp?expno= 632.
114 Amendment 7, Section 2 provides “[t]he Control Yuan shall have 29 members, including a 
president and a vice president, all of whom shall serve a term of six years. All members shall be 
nominated and, with the consent of the Legislative Yuan, appointed by the president of the Republic….”
TAIWAN CONST. amd. 7, §2.
115 Jewel Huang, Chen pledges to accept results with composure, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 12, 2004), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2004/12/12/2003214738.
116 J.Y. Interpretation No. 632, (Const. Ct. Aug. 15, 2007), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/C100/%E6%8A%84%E6%9C%AC632.pdf (petition documents only 
available in the Chinese-language version).
117 Id.
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vote. Because the TCC took over two years to reach its decision, 
Interpretation No. 632 can barely be considered a testament to the TCC’s 
effectiveness in settling political disputes, despite its normative stance on the 
interdepartmental collaboration under the Constitution. Worse still, the 
Parliament did not bother to respond to the TCC’s admonition at all.118 The 
constitutional crisis of the defunct Ombudsmanship was not resolved until 
August 1, 2008, when its vacancies were filled with President Ma’s 
nominees. 119 It was over three-and-a-half years after the Third 
Ombudsmanship closed.   
In view of all the cases discussed in Part II.A., the TCC continued to 
fulfill its constitutional role of guarding the constitutional order by setting 
out normative principles and prescribing procedural guidelines on the 
resolution of political disputes during the period from 2000 to 2008.120 It is 
also true that as the reasoning or dictum of some Interpretations suggests, the 
TCC did try to adopt a more strategic stance to navigate through the political 
storm without compromising the normativity of the constitution. 121
Nevertheless, looking beyond the Justices’ grandiose statements and 
situating the case law in the context of partisan rivalry, the TCC’s record 
during President Chen’s eight-year tenure only demonstrates the failure of 
its activist approach in resolving political disputes in the heat of a 
democratic civil war.
B. An Irrelevant Court amid Escalating Constitutional Conflicts:  
2008–2016
During the period of May 20, 2008 to March 31, 2016, there were 
substantial changes in the personnel of the TCC. With President Chen’s 
appointees gradually replaced by President Ma’s,122 the reconstituted TCC 
departed from its predecessor’s activist approach to constitutional politics. It 
rendered 94 interpretations in total, among which were four “uniform 
interpretations.” 123 In other words, ninety-six percent of the TCC 
118 For a discussion of how judicial admonition functions, see Ming-Sung Kuo, In the Shadow of 
Supremacy: Putting the Idea of Judicial Dialogue in Its Place, 29 RATIO JURIS. 83, 97–101 (2016).
119 Shih Hsiu-chuan, New Control Yuan promises neutrality, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 2, 2008), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2008/08/02/2003419208.
120 See Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15.
121 See Wen-Chen Chang, Strategic Judicial Responses, supra note 33.
122 See Hwang, supra note 25, at 51–54.
123 See supra note 61.
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interpretations promulgated during this period concerned constitutional 
disputes. Among the 90 constitutional interpretations, 87 concerned 
fundamental rights. Only three resulted from political disputes:  
Interpretations No. 645, 729, and 735. Before analyzing these three 
interpretations, several features of the TCC’s case law during this period 
should be noted.  
First, there was an evident decline in productivity. During the 
previous period, the TCC made approximately seventeen decisions 
(constitutional and uniform) each year, whereas the number decreased to 
approximately twelve per year after 2008. This downward development 
indicates that the normative voice of the TCC on constitutional principles
was less likely to be heard. Second, the TCC paid more attention to 
tax-related issues in this period than before, to the extent that the TCC could 
be considered a tax court.124 This also suggests that the TCC focused more 
on the protection of property than on political rights or civil liberties. In 
terms of the technical character of tax law,125 the TCC’s self-transfiguration 
into a tax court suggests its disinclination to hear controversial 
issues. Third, with respect to the case law on important political disputes, 
this period saw a steep fall from the previous one: from ten cases to 
three. Considering the continuing escalation of constitutional conflicts, 
these features, taken together, suggest that the TCC’s role in constitutional 
politics became increasingly irrelevant. After drawing the TCC’s picture in 
broad strokes, this article will now take up its case law to see if it fits into 
the portrayal of an irrelevant court.
It is no surprise the first rulings on important political disputes in TCC 
case law resulted from referrals or petitions made by the preceding 
government, given the slow pace of judicial decision-making.
Interpretation No. 543, promulgated by the TCC during Chen’s presidency, 
was such a case, as was Interpretation No. 645. The political landscape had 
already seen tectonic changes between the date of referral and promulgation 
124 This demeaning characterization of the TCC originated in one of Justice Dennis Tang’s judicial 
opinions.  J.Y. Interpretation No. 713 9 (Const. Ct. Oct. 18, 2013) (Dennis Tang, J., dissenting in part), 
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/uploadfile/C100/713%E9%83%A8%E5%88%86%E4%B8
%8D%E5%90%8C%E6%84%8F%E8%A6%8B%E6%9B%B8%EF%BC%88%E6%B9%AF%E5%A4%A
7%E6%B3%95%E5%AE%98%E5%BE%B7%E5%AE%97%EF%BC%89.pdf (only available in Chinese).  
It should be noted that the TCC didn’t technically turn into a tax court, but with its reluctance to intervene 
in political controversies, its focus on tax issues became salient.
125 SHELDON D. POLLACK, FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY: REVENUE AND POLITICS 83 (1996).
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in both cases. Due to the gap between the time of referral and 
promulgation, both interpretations bore little on their respective underlying 
political disputes. Even so, the insignificance of Interpretation No. 543
inflicted no harm on the confident TCC because it had already promulgated 
Interpretation No. 520 more than a year prior, setting the tone for an activist 
court.126 In contrast, Interpretation No. 645 only reflected the continuing 
decline of the TCC’s role in Taiwan’s constitutional politics in the 
twenty-first century.
The legal issue at the center of Interpretation No. 645 was whether the 
provision on the formation of the Referendum Review Committee (RRC) in 
the Referendum Act of 2003 contravened the separation of powers 
principle. Under that provision, the Premier was under a statutory duty to 
appoint those nominated by the parliamentary caucuses while its 
membership was allocated in proportion to each party’s parliamentary 
seats.127 In light of the precedent set in Interpretation No. 613, the case was 
relatively straightforward, with Interpretation No. 645 rendering the RRC 
provision unconstitutional for depriving the Premier of the appointment
power with respect to the RCC,128 which was part of the administration of 
referendum. The TCC thus declared the RRC provision unconstitutional and 
set a one-year limit on its repeal.129 However, taking into account the 
political climate at the time, this ruling further evidences the TCC’s 
declining role in constitutional politics.
As noted in Part II.A.2., the trouble in President Chen’s second term 
stemmed from his votes-garnering stratagem: pairing a referendum to the 
2004 presidential election. The Referendum Act at the center of 
Interpretation No. 645 was forced through in December 2003 to pave the 
way for holding the planned parallel referendum. Despite their status as the 
parliamentary majority, the Pan Blue parties stopped short of killing the bill 
for fear that doing so would backfire in the coming presidential 
election. But, to minimize the impact of the prospective referendum and its 
implications of self-determination, the Pan Blue inserted its own version of 
126 See supra notes 49–60 and accompanying text. 
127 J.Y. Interpretation No. 645 (Const. Ct. July 11, 2008), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/EN/p03_01.asp?expno=645 (CONST. CT. INTERP., July 11, 2008). 
128 See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
129 Jiunn-rong Yeh, Presidential Politics, supra note 15, at 937.  For a discussion that emphasizes its 
indirect admonition of party intervention, see WEN-CHEN CHANG ET AL., supra note 15, at 540.
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the RRC provision into the Referendum Act; the Pan Blue expected that the 
RRC would filter out most citizen-initiated proposals for referendum, as all 
proposals were subject to the RRC’s vetting.130 Furthermore, to ensure the 
Pan Blue’s control over the RRC, it provided that its membership was to be 
allocated in proportion to each party’s parliamentary seats and to be 
effectively decided by the parliamentary caucuses.131 It was against this 
backdrop of partisan calculation that the Pan Green MPs referred the RRC 
provision to the TCC in early 2004, with the presidential election less than 
three months away. Yet the TCC did not deliver its final judgment until July 
2008. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to pinpoint why the TCC failed to 
deliver a timely response. Nevertheless, it is not a far-fetched suggestion 
that had the TCC intervened in time, it could have borne heavily on the 
political debate in early 2004, and even influenced the presidential 
election.132 Even if it would not have intervened in the holding of the 
referendum and the presidential election, its ruling on the formation of the 
RRC would have provided constitutional guidance on the controversy over 
the NCC’s creation. As a result of the TCC’s failure to intervene in time, 
however, it was Interpretation No. 613 that shed light on Interpretation No. 
645. Moreover, when Interpretation No. 645 was promulgated in July 2008, 
the Pan Blue had regained its domination of the political landscape, and 
there had been five unsuccessful referendums since 2004. In terms of the 
constitutional significance of the introduction of referendums to Taiwan, the 
TCC had missed its opportunity to voice the constitutional principles 
concerning referendums in the early stage.  By the time it promulgated 
Interpretation No. 645, it was too late.133 As it turned out, even the amended 
RRC and new appointment procedures passed in 2009 suffered public 
criticism for filtering out several citizen-initiated referendum proposals that 
130 See Mily Ming-Tzu Kao, supra note 70, at 594–97.
131 Fiona Lu, Legislature passes referendum law, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 28, 2003), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/ News/front/archives/2003/11/28/2003077523/1.
132 It is true that the parallel referendum was not subject to the RRC’s vetting as it was initiated by the 
President under the controversial “defensive referendum” clause.  Mily Ming-Tzu Kao, supra note 70, at 
601.  Nevertheless, a judicial ruling on the RRC provision could impact the debate surrounding the 
presidential call for a referendum at that time.  
133 Except the defensive referendum held in conjunction with the 2004 presidential election, there 
were two citizen-initiated referendums held together with the parliamentary and presidential elections in 
2008, respectively.  Neither passed the statutory threshold to be binding.  
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were aimed at reversing the KMT Government’s China policy.134 Instead of 
prescribing constitutional principles guiding the relationship between the 
executive and the legislative power in the intensified partisan politics, 
Interpretation No. 645 reflected the TCC’s irrelevance after 2008.
After Interpretation No. 645 was decided in 2008, the TCC did not 
decide another important political dispute for seven years. On the surface, 
Interpretation No. 729 concerned the scope of parliamentary investigative 
power with respect to documents held by the Administration.135 It resulted 
from a referral by the Administration at the behest of the Supreme 
Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) in late November 2013, which disputed the 
parliamentary request for the dossier of a criminal investigation on October 
29 on the grounds that it encroached on the core of the executive 
power.136 The TCC did not respond until May 1, 2015 when it promulgated 
Interpretation No. 729. Referring to the EPIC I interpretation, the TCC ruled 
that the dossier of an ongoing case was off-limits to the Parliament, and 
restrictively delineated the parliamentary investigative power concerning 
closed cases.137 Read on its own, Interpretation No. 729 appeared to be 
another instance of the TCC’s attempts to rein in an uncontrolled 
Parliament. A different picture emerges, however, when the case is read in 
light of its root cause: the disputed parliamentary request.
The parliamentary request in question was made when the Parliament 
was debating private member bills in a proposed amendment of the 
Communications Privacy Act (CPA), which was prompted by a wiretapping 
scandal in a high political drama.138 At the heart of this political drama was 
the long-term political antagonism between President Ma and his KMT rival 
Mr. Wang Jin-pyng, the Speaker of the Parliament, with other supporting 
actors, including Prosecutor General Mr. Huang Shi-ming and the DPP whip 
Mr. Ker Chien-ming. The Parliament was prompted into action as a result of 
134 Loa Iok-sin, Committee rejects request for referendum on ECFA, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 28, 2009), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2009/08/28/2003452214.
135 J.Y. Interpretation No. 729 (Const. Ct. May 1, 2015), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=729 (only available in Chinese).
136 J.Y. Interpretation No. 729 (Const. Ct. May 1, 2015), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/uploadfile/C100/%E6%8A%84%E6%9C%AC729.pdf (referral documents) (only available in 
Chinese).
137 Id.
138 Chris Wang, DPP proposes a central wiretapping authority, TAIPEI TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/11/04/2003576115.
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Mr. Huang’s briefing to President Ma in September 2013. Acting on that 
briefing, President Ma, in his capacity as the KMT Chair, publicly referred 
the Speaker to the KMT disciplinary committee for his alleged attempt to 
unduly influence a criminal investigation implicating Mr. Ker by lobbying 
the Minister of Justice.139 This referral could have led to the loss of Mr. 
Wang’s parliamentary seat.140 Thus, not only were both President Ma and 
Prosecutor General Huang accused of corrupting the integrity of the SPO, 
which was supposed to stay clear of political influence, but their 
collaboration was also seen as a plot to bring down the Speaker.141
Beneath these concerns is another disturbing fact: the charge against 
the Speaker was based on the transcript of a wiretap that had received a
court warrant for a different case in 2010. Based on the 2010 warrant and its 
continuous renewals issued under the CPA, the SPO extended its wiretap 
dragnet to include the official phone lines of Parliament.142 Accusing the 
SPO of unlawfully wiretapping and intruding on parliamentary privileges, 
MPs moved to request the case dossier concerning the wiretapping of the 
Speaker, not only to expose the wayward SPO; the requested dossier was 
also thought to be potentially informative for the amendment under 
consideration.143
Read in light of this backdrop, Interpretation No. 729 was the opposite 
of what the TCC suggested. Instead of an uncontrolled Parliament intent on 
interfering with the prosecution of criminalities, it was the SPO that had run 
amok. Removed from this political context, the TCC seemed to let the SPO 
avoid punishment and took the Parliament to task seventeen months after the 
wiretapping scandal broke. In the meantime, the SPO did not escape from 
139 Chris Wang, Majority side with Wang against KMT expulsion: poll, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 12, 
2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/09/12/2003571931.
140 Part of the parliamentary seats was decided by popular vote with the rest determined according to 
proportionate representation (PR).  Mr. Wang was not elected by popular vote.  He was on the KMT 
party list for the PR MPs, which were allocated according to the votes each qualified party received.  His 
MP seat was contingent on his KMT membership.  Although he was expelled from the party, he remained 
the Speaker until the end of his term with the intervention of the ordinary courts that issued an injunction 
on the KMT’s expulsion resolution.  See Yen-tu Su, The Partisan Ordering of Candidacies and the 
Pluralism of the Law of Democracy: The Case of Taiwan, 15 ELECTION L.J. 31, 44 n.18 (2016).
141 Chris Wang, MA-WANG SHOWDOWN: President accused of using SID as “personal tool,”
TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/09/12/2003571952.
142 Mo Yan-chih et al., Politicians indignant at new wiretap accusations, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 29, 
2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/print/2013/09/29/2003573255. 
143 Shih Hsiu-chuan & Rich Chang, Disclosure of “September strife” probe demanded, TAIPEI TIMES 
(Dec. 28, 2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/12/28/2003579956.
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the Parliament’s wrath. Receiving no response from the TCC, the 
Parliament simply resorted to “self-help”: the amendment was passed in late 
January 2014 with the SPO’s capacity to conduct wiretapping substantially 
curtailed.144 Although the legislative self-help seemed to suggest that the 
TCC’s late intervention made room for the political branches to work out 
their differences, this was simply an unsubstantiated perception. Had the 
TCC spoken on the matter in time, Interpretation No. 729 would have been 
easily read in context. The Interpretation would not have been read to 
describe the immaculate SPO fighting the unruly parliamentary intervention 
for the integrity of criminal investigation and for the protection of 
communications privacy.  Moreover, the legislative reaction, unguided by 
constitutional principles, only plunged the executive-legislative relationship 
into a downward spiral and cast doubt on the ill-considered 
amendment.145 Interpretation No. 729 was another clear example of the 
TCC willingly turning into an irrelevant spectator of a triangular 
constitutional play among the President, the SPO (nominally attached to the 
Administration), and the Parliament.
Less than three weeks after the historical elections on January 16, 
2016,146 the TCC promulgated Interpretation No. 735. In line with its 
post-2008 practices, the TCC spoke only after the controversy had already 
been resolved. While Interpretation No. 735 expanded upon the 
constitutional provision for the vote of no confidence (Amendment 3, 
Section 2, clause 3) and ruled that the statutory restriction on the motion of 
no confidence during a special parliamentary session was 
unconstitutional,147 the underlying cause of its referral was the Pan Green’s 
no-confidence motion against the Administration on July 25, 2012. 148
Again, the time lag exposes the TCC’s lethargy. Yet Interpretation No. 735 
itself is the culmination of constitutional anomalies in the midst of declining 
constitutional influence.
144 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Legislature passes wiretap restrictions, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/01/15/2003581314.
145 E.g., Rich Chang, Prosecutors unhappy with wiretapping rule changes, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 16, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/01/16/2003581395.
146 See infra Part IV.
147 J.Y. Interpretation No. 735 (Const. Ct. Feb. 4, 2016); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutional
court/p03_01.asp?expno=735 (only available in Chinese).
148 Id.
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The first anomaly concerns the Administration’s unusual tenure. As a 
consequence of a controversial rescheduling of the presidential election,149
President Ma was re-elected in January 14, 2012, although he would not be 
sworn in for his second term until May 20. In the meantime, he had 
appointed a new Premier, Sean Chen, in early February when he was still 
serving his first term. Three-and-a-half months later, Premier Chen was 
reappointed as President Ma officially began his second term.150 Yet, at that 
time, Premier Chen’s Administration was already embroiled in various 
policy controversies, including the intractable issues surrounding the 
proposed lifting of a ban on the importation of American beef, on which 
domestic politics and foreign relations were intertwined.151 Premier Chen 
was even unprecedentedly prevented from fulfilling his constitutional duty 
to introduce his general policy statement before the Parliament within the 
statutorily prescribed timeline by the combative Pan Green.152
The second anomaly was the opposition Pan Green’s inconsistent 
constitutional moves. By the end of the regular parliamentary session in 
mid-June, it continuously boycotted the Administration but fell short of a 
motion of no confidence. Pan Green’s introduction of the July 25 
no-confidence motion was not a result of Premier Chen’s policies, but rather 
the Administration Chief of Staff’s corruption scandal in late June when the 
KMT caucus had moved to convene a four-day special parliamentary session 
to address many unresolved issues from July 24 to 27.153 Acting under the 
statute governing the exercise of the legislative power, however, the Speaker 
rejected the Pan Green’s no-confidence motion against Premier Chen 
outright as it was not on the predetermined legislative agenda of the special 
session.154 Intriguingly, the Pan Green MPs waited almost two months to 
149 This unprecedented change will be further discussed in infra Part III.
150 Shih Hsiu-chuan, MA’S RE-INAUGURATION: Despite calls for reshuffle, Cabinet largely
unchanged, TAIPEI TIMES (May 20, 2012), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/05/20/
2003533281..ġ
151 E.g., Chan Shun-kuei, Editorial, Lifting beef ban ignores big picture, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 12, 
2012), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2012/03/12/2003527562.
152 According to amendment 3 of the Constitution and other legislation, a new Premier must introduce 
the general policy statement before the Parliament within two weeks following his appointment. Shih 
Hsiu-chuan, Opposition block premier’s speech, TAIPEI TIMES (June 2, 2012), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/06/02/2003534326. 
153 Chris Wang & Shih Hsiu-chuan, No-confidence vote on premier sought, TAIPEI TIMES (July 25, 
2012), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/07/25/2003538567.
154 Chris Wang, Wang Jin-pyng rejects no-confidence motion, TAIPEI TIMES (July 26, 2012), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/07/26/2003538673.
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refer the relevant statutory provisions to the TCC on September 17, after the 
new ordinary session had already begun.155 More baffling was that the Pan 
Green introduced a new no-confidence motion against Premier Chen the 
next day, which was defeated on September 22.156 In other words, with its 
own move on September 18, the Pan Green effectively rendered its referral 
to the TCC moot.
Even so, the TCC delivered Interpretation No. 735 three-and-a-half 
years after the referral, when the curtain was being drawn on the KMT 
Government and the new Parliament had already opened. This is the third 
anomaly.  Removed from its convoluted political context, the terse 
Interpretation No. 735 reads like an entry on the motion of no confidence in 
a treatise on constitutional law. It may be praised for its liberal 
interpretation of the parliamentary power to introduce no-confidence 
motions in both the regular and special parliamentary sessions.157 But when 
it came to the TCC’s real-world influence, Interpretation No. 735 epitomized 
the TCC’s irrelevance to political disputes as they had gradually found 
settlement outside the judicial channel in the years preceding it, a theme to 
which Part III will turn shortly. 
Taken together, the TCC’s reluctance to give voice to the constitution 
during the studied period, especially when it came to controversial issues, 
resulted in its irrelevance to the development of constitutional politics. If the 
activist TCC was the linchpin of the judicialization of politics, which 
underlay the growth of constitutionalism in Taiwan’s democratic transition, 
the TCC’s disappearance from the political landscape after 2008 clearly 
indicates the turn to de-judicialization. To be sure, this may suggest a move
from legal or judicial constitutionalism to political constitutionalism.158 Yet, 
in terms of escalating constitutional conflicts and political paralysis in this 
period, the constitutional politics that resulted from de-judicialization did not 
seem to correspond to what political constitutionalists would have been fond 
155 J.Y. Interpretation No. 735 (Const. Ct. Feb. 4, 2016).
156 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Sean Chen survives no-confidence vote 66 to 46, TAIPEI TIMES (Sept. 23, 2012), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/09/23/2003543440.
157 See, e.g., Jason Pan, Lawmakers’ no-confidence motion rights upheld, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 6, 
2016), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/02/06/2003638951.
158 See generally RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENSE OF 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY (2007).
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of. If it is not political constitutionalism, then what is it?  Part III will try to 
answer this question. 
III. W(H)ITHERS THE CONSTITUTION: FROM JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
TO CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS?
As the preceding analysis has shown, the TCC has been gradually 
losing its normative grip on constitutional politics since 2000. If
constitutional politics work in a way in which constitutional principles are 
carried out through political dynamics taking place outside judicial channels, 
it means that the constitution continues to thrive in the face of the abatement 
of judicial activism.  It may thus be argued that Taiwan has bid farewell to 
judicial constitutionalism while the normative constitution keeps shining 
even brighter under political constitutionalism.159 Yet the problem is that 
while the constitutional order in Taiwan may be moving out of such judicial 
channels, the political landscape has not become a fertile ground for the 
Constitution, but rather turned into an unconstrained battlefield of unruly 
partisan politics.
The foremost example of the Constitution’s weakening grip on the
political order is that the Constitution has been invisible on the most 
important constitutional issue—the relationship between Taiwan and China 
(also known as the “cross-strait relationship”)—since the TCC began to 
retreat from the stage of constitutional politics. 160 Because Taiwanese 
society has long been divided on its political relationship with 
China—independence or union—whether to build stronger bilateral relations 
has been the most sensitive subject on the political agenda.161 Apart from 
the strategic choice between further economic and political union or ultimate 
independence, the parliamentary role in the Government’s dealings with 
159 Id. at 145–75.
160 Some interpretations tackle human rights issues resulting from the cross-strait relations, such as 
Interpretations No. 497, 618, 710 and 712.  These interpretations do not, however, deal with the 
relationship itself or the political disputes it concerns. See J.Y. Interpretation No. 497 (Const. Ct. Dec. 3, 
1999); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=497; J.Y. Interpretation No. 
618 (Const. Ct. Nov. 3, 2006); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=618;
J.Y. Interpretation No. 710 (Const. Ct. July 5, 2013); http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/en/p0
3_01.asp?expno=710; J.Y. Interpretation No. 712 (Const. Ct. Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.judicial.gov.tw/
constitutionalcourt/en/p03_01.asp?expno=712.
161 See Weixing Hu, Prospects of Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: Toward an Involutional Process?,
in NEW DYNAMICS IN CROSS-TAIWAN STRAITS RELATIONS: HOW FAR CAN THE RAPPROCHEMENT GO? 218, 
226–27 (Weixing Hu ed., 2013).
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China has been at the center of political debates.  With a series of bilateral 
agreements signed and their impact percolating through numerous aspects of 
everyday life in the first two years of President Ma’s first term, the calls for 
more robust parliamentary oversight of Taiwan-China relations became 
stronger. This issue came to a head when the Cross-Straits Economic 
Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), the equivalent of a free trade 
agreement, was signed in June 2010 due to fears that it would set an 
irreversible course towards further economic integration and ultimately 
political union.162
One of the primary issues motivating the ECFA debate was whether it 
required parliamentary approval. While the KMT Government contended 
that it did not and would come into force if it received no up-or-down vote 
from the Parliament within three months, the opposition Pan Green insisted 
that it required legislative ratification and the Parliament had the right to 
revise its content. 163 Although it received parliamentary approval in 
mid-August, the constitutional question as to the parliamentary oversight of 
the Taiwan-China relations was left unanswered. On the other hand, even if 
it was passed (despite the Pan Green objection), its contents were still 
controversial and continued to raise constitutional concerns.164 Notably, 
even before both sides of the Taiwan Strait formally signed the ECFA, 
several proposals had been initiated to block it by referendum. Yet none of 
them passed the RRC’s vetting, calling the constitutional status of the RRC 
in implementing referendums into question again.165 It is also noteworthy 
that petitions for the TCC to intervene and exercise judicial review of the 
RRC decision by the administrative courts were also considered.166
To be clear, there is a clear distinction between the constitutional 
question of the parliamentary oversight of Taiwan-China relations and the 
issues surrounding the reconstituted RRC and its vetting procedures: the 
162 See Ming-Sung Kuo, W(h)ither the Idea of Publicness?, supra note 10, at 233–37.
163 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Ma, Wang disagree on ECFA review, TAIPEI TIMES (July 3, 2010), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/07/03/2003477022/1. See also Sung Kuo, W(h)ither 
the Idea of Publicness?, supra note 10, at 248–49. 
164 Compare Ming-Sung Kuo, W(h)ither the Idea of Publicness?, supra note 10, at 254 (questioning
the ECFA’s extraconstitutional character), with Jiunn-rong Yeh & Wen-Chen Chang, supra note 25, at 165 
(noting the lack of public participation in the approval of the ECFA).
165 See, e.g., Huang Kuo-chang, Editorial, Overhaul of Referendum Act Can Be a Rallying Cry,
TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 14, 2010), http://taiwantt.org.tw/taipeitimes/2010/08/20100814-06.htm.
166 Jenny W. Hsu, DPP firm on changing referendum law, TAIPEI TIMES (Aug. 29, 2009), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2009/08/29/2003452244.
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former concerns the separation of powers between the Parliament and the 
Government, whereas the latter resulted from individual political 
rights. Nevertheless, beneath this doctrinal distinction was a fundamental 
issue concerning Taiwan’s political future. It was the existential question of 
Taiwan as a constitutional polity that was at the root of the various attempted 
constitutional petitions.  Without going into detail about the reasons why 
the TCC failed to intervene, it should be noted that this fundamental political 
issue and its derivatives were fought outside of institutional channels and its 
impact on constitutional politics would be felt beyond the ECFA itself.
Soon after the ECFA was ratified, further negotiations on the 
liberalization of service sectors began in February 2011 and the resulting 
“Cross-Straits Service Trade Agreement” (STA) was formally signed in June 
2013.167 As its impact on economy and society was expected to be even 
broader and deeper than the ECFA, it elicited strong objections from 
citizens, political groups, and the media. 168 Viewing the STA as the 
cornerstone of his policy to move Taiwan even closer to China, however, 
President Ma and his Government threatened that the STA would come into 
force if the Parliament failed to give the STA an up-or-down vote within 
three months.169 Thus, the unanswered constitutional question as to the 
parliamentary role in the dealings with China came to the surface again.  
Moreover, Speaker Wang of the Parliament, President Ma’s long-time 
political rival, sympathized with public concerns and delayed parliament 
passing the STA by subjecting it to close legislative scrutiny.170 At this 
juncture, the issue of the parliamentary role in the Taiwan-China relations 
was intertwined with political vendettas. The Speaker’s parliamentary 
maneuver was considered the root cause of President Ma’s surprising move 
to unseat him in September 2013.171 Seen in this light, the constitutional 
question as to the parliamentary role in the Taiwan-China relations was not 
167 Mo Yan-chih, Cross-strait service trade pact signed, TAIPEI TIMES (June 22, 2013), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2013/06/22/2003565371.
168 Loa Iok-sin & Rich Chang, Groups Voice PRC Trade Pact Concerns, Cross-Strait Service Trade 
Pact Signed, TAIPEI TIMES (June 22, 2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/06/
22/2003565390.  
169 Shih Hsiu-chuan, Legislature to vote on new pact item-by-item: speaker, TAIPEI TIMES (June 27, 
2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/06/27/2003565772.
170 Shih Hsiu-chuan & Mo Yan-chih, Cabinet approves cross-strait service trade pact, TAIPEI TIMES 
(June 28, 2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/06/28/2003565848. 
171 Su Yung-yao & Jake Chung, Wang row ploy to push through trade deal: DPP, TAIPEI TIMES 
(Sept. 21, 2013), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2013/09/21/2003572669.
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resolved by judicial means. Nor was it settled in political channels under the 
guidance of constitutional principles. Instead, it was addressed by 
anti-constitutional political stratagems underpinned by a series of 
constitutionally dubious wiretapping and palace politics.172
Determined to push the STA through Parliament, President Ma, again 
in his capacity as KMT Chair, gave orders to the KMT MPs to close the 
parliamentary debate on the STA despite street demonstrations and the 
parliamentary reaction to his failed political maneuverer against the 
Speaker.173 When the STA was forced through the committee stage on 
March 17, 2014, it immediately provoked mass protests, leading to the 
occupation of the Parliament Building the next day. 174 At this point, 
constitutional order was on the verge of breakdown. Although constitutional 
order did not fail and the STA was shelved for the time being,175 the fact 
that the constitutional dispute over the Parliament’s role in the 
Taiwan-China relations culminated in the three-week occupation of the 
Parliament Building reflected the withering of the Constitution in the move 
towards de-judicialization.176
The relationship between Taiwan and China was not the only issue 
that was fought extra-constitutionally. The unprecedented decision to move 
the conventional presidential election day from March 20 (or the preceding 
or ensuing Saturday) ahead to January 14, 2012 was another example of raw 
politics unbound by the Constitution in the midst of de-judicialization.  
Although the Constitution does not expressly provide for the beginning and 
end of a presidential term or the date of a presidential election, it had been a 
settled convention until 2011 that the election should be held on the 
preceding or ensuing Saturday of March 20 of the election year and then the 
172 See Yen-tu Su, supra note 140, at 43–45, 44 n.18 (suggesting the constitutional implications of 
party internal rules in light of the Ma-Wang Strife). 
173 Shih Hsiao-kuang et al., KMT steps up efforts to promote pact, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 16, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/03/16/2003585772.
174 Chris Wang, Opposition, groups protest trade pact, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 19, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/03/19/2003586009.
175 Alison Hsiao & Loa Iok-sin, Wang vows monitoring law before pact, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 7, 2014), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2014/04/07/2003587457.
176 But cf. Chia Ming Chen, Searching for Constitutional Authority in the Sunflower Movement, 45 
HONG KONG L.J. 211 (2015) (suggesting the occupation action as an exercise of self-constituting authority 
by the occupants).
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President should be sworn in on May 20.177 In terms of the impact of an 
electoral calendar on a campaign and even election results, the idea of 
moving the election day two months ahead was extraordinary and 
controversial when it was first proposed in 2010.178 Under the pretext of 
saving administrative costs by holding the 2012 presidential election on the 
same day as the next parliamentary election, which must take place in 
mid-January at the latest, this extraordinary proposal was regarded as part of 
the KMT’s political maneuvering for its own gain. Considering President 
Ma’s low approval ratings, the opposition believed that he could benefit 
from the KMT MP candidates who were seen as commanding grassroots 
political support if the presidential and parliamentary elections were held on 
the same day.179
When the Central Election Commission (CEC)–an independent 
agency within the Administration responsible for the administration of 
elections, including the selection of election dates–took up this proposal in 
early 2011, serious concerns were raised.180 In addition to the election 
date’s impact on the elections, it also raised concerns over thousands of new 
voters being excluded from the voter register.181 But the more concerning 
problem was that it would double the length of the interval between the 
presidential election day and the inauguration day,182 increasing government 
instability and the political risk inherent during the so-called “presidential 
transition.”183 In terms of its deviation from the established constitutional 
convention and its grave consequences for the entire constitutional order, it 
was argued that a constitutional amendment would be required to change 
constitutional conventions regarding the presidential election date.184
Immediate reactions to the CEC’s decision on April 19, 2011 that both 
the presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held on January 14,
177 Chen In-chin, Editorial, Polls merger may be undemocratic, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/04/12/2003500517.
178 Loa Iok-sin & Vincent Y. Chao, Election merger plan sparks debate, TAIPEI TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2010/12/06/2003490218.
179 Id.
180 See Chia Ming Chen, supra note 176.
181 Hawang [sic] Shiow-duan, Understanding combined elections, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 9, 2011), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2011/04/09/2003500271.
182 See Chia Ming Chen, supra note 176.
183 See generally Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential 
Transitions, 894 N.C.L. REV. 1254 (2006).  
184 See Chia Ming Chen, supra note 176; Hawang [sic] Shiow-duan, supra note 181.
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2012 were angry, strongly condemning the CEC’s submission to the ruling 
KMT.185 Calls for the TCC’s intervention were also voiced.186 Yet the 
vociferous criticisms of this anti-constitutional political gambit were 
eventually drowned out by boisterous campaign rhetoric as both the KMT 
and the DPP shifted attention from the constitutional argument to the 
judgment of the election day.  President Ma won a landslide re-election on 
January 14, 2012, and the issue of a deliberately extended presidential 
transition and its potential constitutional crisis seems to have become a moot 
point for the time being. 
In light of the election result, the change of the presidential election 
date may be interpreted as an instance of extra-constitutional amendment 
instead of anti-constitutional action.  The problem is that this action neither 
enhanced the government’s stability nor strengthened the fundamental right 
to vote. Its only consequence was to establish precedent that a self-created 
lengthened period of the presidential transition is no longer inconceivable 
under the Constitution. Notably, this prophesy was fulfilled on January 16, 
2016 when the DPP presidential candidate Ms. Tsai Ing-wen defeated the 
KMT, igniting calls for shortening the term of President Ma’s lame-duck 
presidency by legislation to minimize the constitutional risk inherent in the 
extended presidential transition.187
In sum, the controversies over the parliamentary role in the 
Taiwan-China relationship and the presidential election date illustrate 
declining constitutional normativity, with the TCC retreating from the 
constitutional stage. As it turns out, what has taken the place of judicial 
constitutionalism is untamed constitutional politics that work against the 
ideal of political constitutionalism and thus withers the normative 
constitution.   
185 Lin Shu-hui & Chen Hui-ping, CEC approves simultaneous elections, TAIPEI TIMES (Apr. 20, 
2011), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/04/20/2003501206.
186 Ceng Wei Zhen (㚦杳䤶), Fa Xue Xue Zhe: Bing Xuan Kong Wei Xian Zheng Guan Lin (㱽⬠⬠
侭灼Ἕ怠⿸忽ㅚ㓧ㄋἳ) [Legal Scholars: Election Merger Contravenes Constitutional Convention], Zi 
You Shi Bao (冒䓙㗪⟙) [LIBERTY TIMES] (May 1, 2011), http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/ 
488799. 
187 Abraham Gerber, NPP urges shorter transitions of power, TAIPEI TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016), 
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that, contrary to the popular view among TCC 
scholars that the TCC has continued to be an activist and authoritative player 
in constitutional politics, the influence of the TCC has been waning since 
2000.  The decline of the TCC cannot be attributed to shifting judicial 
philosophy alone. As the TCC case law during President Chen’s eight-year 
tenure indicates, the TCC remained an activist court, although it failed to be 
an effective constitutional player.  The TCC did not become more active 
after the KMT’s return to power in 2008.  Reluctant to give voice to 
constitutional principles, the TCC became less and less relevant to 
constitutional politics.  Unfortunately, what has accompanied this move 
towards the de-judicialization of politics has not been robust political 
constitutionalism aimed at the implementation of constitutional norms 
outside the judicial channel. Instead, looming from the political landscape 
where the TCC has been invisible is an unconstrained politics that plays 
with, instead of playing by, the Constitution. Thus, although the TCC has 
remained the ordained interpreter of constitutional norms, constitutional 
normativity has been chipped away on its watch. With judicial 
constitutionalism displaced by untamed constitutional politics, the TCC is 
reduced to a nominal court while the Constitution withers.
Juxtaposed with its record during the twentieth century, the TCC’s 
overall performance in the twenty-first century tells us that a constitutional 
court is not a master of politics, but rather thrives or withers in the delicacy 
of constitutional politics. Taiwan’s political landscape is shifting again. The 
DPP and its candidate Ms. Tsai significantly outperformed the KMT in both 
the presidential and parliamentary elections on January 16, 2016. The 
DPP’s electoral victory is historical. Not only did its candidate win the 
presidency by a wide margin, but it also became the majority party in the 
Parliament for the first time.188 The long-time political behemoth KMT has 
been plunged into intense infighting ever since. 189 Constitutional 
188 Ms. Tsai received approximately 56% of popular votes in a three-way race, while the DPP won 68 
out of 113 parliamentary seats. Loa Iok-sin, et al., ELECTIONS: Madam President, TAIPEI TIMES (Jan. 17, 
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17, 2016), http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/01/17/2003637414 (reporting the 
parliamentary elections).
189 Stacy Hsu, Tensions mount at KMT forum, TAIPEI TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
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discussions abound in this new political landscape.190 At the dawn of a new 
political era, it remains to be seen whether the TCC will be able to reclaim 
its past glory by reinvigorating the withered Constitution. 
190 See, e.g., Chang Hsiao-ti & Jonathan Chin, Alliance touts constitutional reforms (Mar. 16, 2016), 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/03/16/2003641702.
